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Summary 
This thesis examined the conscious processing hypothesis as a potential explanation 
for the way in which anxiety affects motor performance. The thesis is written as a 
series of research papers (studies). The five papers are preceded by a general 
introduction and followed by a general discussion. The first study replicated and 
extended previous research in the area of conscious processing. Participants acquired 
the skill of golf putting explicitly and implicitly across 400 trials. During a high 
anxiety transfer test, the performance of participants who learned explicitly was less 
robust than that of participants who learned implicitly, supporting the conscious 
processing hypothesis. Study 2 tested the conscious processing hypothesis using a 
performance rather than learning paradigm to control for possible desensitisation 
effects identified as a possible alternative explanation for the results of study 1. 
Results supported the conscious processing hypothesis, but an alternative attentional 
explanation was identified. Study 3 examined the conscious processing hypothesis 
while controlling for both desensitisation and attentional effects. Kinematic measures 
were also adopted to examine the golf putting task in vivo. Performance results 
partially supported the conscious processing hypothesis. Study 4 replicated and 
extended the design adopted in study 3. Study 4 also examined processing efficiency 
theory as a plausible alternative to the conscious processing hypothesis. Kinematic 
and cardiovascular measures were incorporated into the design. Performance scores 
suggested a processing efficiency interpretation. However, conscious processing 
effects could not be totally discounted. The fifth study examined the suggestion that 
the use of process goals by skilled but anxious performers might actively encourage 
lapses into conscious processing. Increases in state anxiety did not produce 
performance decrements. A lack of training in the use of goals was identified as an 
explanation for the absence of performance impairment. Implications for future 
research and applied practice are derived from the five studies. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
One. of the key challenges faced by sport psychology is to ensure that the 
interventions provided for athletes have a sound theoretical underpinning. In this 
respect, the success of applied consultancy work depends upon the development and 
availability of a sound knowledge base founded upon theory and research (Jones, 
1995). A problem frequently encountered by the consulting sport psychologist is the 
inability of some performers to deal with the stress and anxiety that characterise both 
preparation and performance at the highest levels of sport (Orlick & Partington, 
1988). As a result, the sport psychology literature is replete with articles, books, 
manuals, and tapes devoted to helping athletes deal with anxiety. 
Sport psychologists have also generated a large amount of empirical research 
addressing a variety of aspects associated with anxiety and sports performance. 
These have included issues surrounding the measurement of anxiety in sport (Burton, 
1998) and various theories, hypotheses and models of anxiety and sports 
performance. The theoretical relationship between anxiety and performance has 
produced a large body of research adopting a variety of approaches including drive 
theory (Hull, 1943; Spence & Spence, 1966), the inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908), individual zones of optimal functioning (Hanin, 1997), 
multidimensional anxiety theory (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and catastrophe 
models (Hardy & Fazey, 1987). A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this 
chapter and the reader is directed to Hardy, Jones and Gould (1996) and Jones 
(1995). Recently, researchers have also begun to examine performers' interpretations 
of their anxiety states. Specifically, researchers have begun to acknowledge that 
performers may interpret their anxiety in different ways (Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 
1993; Mahoney & Avener, 1977) and that cognitive anxiety may not always be 
detrimental to performance (Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991). Hanin 
(2000) has applauded this move away from a narrow, negatively oriented focus on 
anxiety-performance relationships. 
Despite an abundance of theoretical advances, researchers have still been unable 
to identify the exact mechanisms via which anxiety actually affects performance. 
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Theoretical developments such as catastrophe models (Hardy, 1990; Hardy, 1996b; 
Hardy & Fazey, 1987) may enable researchers to better predict the exact 
combination of circumstances that result in a negative relationship between anxiety 
and performance. However, models that explain the processes that mediate the 
effects of anxiety upon motor skills are comparatively under-researched. 
The main purpose of this introduction is to briefly review some of the theories 
that purport to explain how anxiety affects performance. However, before doing so, 
the next section attempts to address some conceptual problems that have clouded the 
use of terms such as stress, anxiety, arousal, and activation in stress and anxiety 
research. In so doing, this section draws heavily on the work of Hardy, Jones and 
Gould (1996). 
Definition of key terms 
Stress 
Stress can be regarded as a state in which some demand is placed upon an individual 
who is then required to react in some way in order to be able to cope with the 
situation (Jones, 1990). As a result, depending upon the individual's perception of 
their ability to cope with the demands of the stressor in question, stress may or may 
not impose a "strain" upon the individual (Jick & Payne, 1980; Lazarus, 1966). 
Thus, it is the individual's perception or cognitive appraisal of the situation that is 
the crucial factor in the stress process. Where an individual perceives that they do 
not possess the resources or capabilities to cope with the perceived demand placed 
upon them by a stressor, it is likely that feelings of anxiety will ensue (Jones & 
Hardy, 1989). 
Anxiety 
It is generally accepted that anxiety is an unpleasant emotional response. Although 
there are different perspectives on just how emotions are generated (e. g. Lazarus, 
1982; Zajonc, 1984), the dominant view is that, even in their most implicit form, 
emotions are the result of cognitive processing (Eysenck, 1992; Lazarus, 1991). 
Thus, to fully understand anxiety as an emotional response it would appear necessary 
to consider the cognitive processes that trigger such a response. It is important to 
distinguish between anxiety as a transitory emotional state and anxiety as an 
individual difference personality variable (Smith, Smoll, & Wiechman, 1998). 
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Spielberger (1966) differentiated between the momentary level of anxiety 
experienced by individuals (state anxiety) and the relatively stable personality 
disposition (trait anxiety). Individuals high in trait anxiety are more prone to view a 
variety of situations as threatening and respond with high levels of state anxiety. The 
interactional perspective allowed anxiety researchers to move away from the more 
traditional trait paradigm prominent during the 1950s and early 1960s (Sarason, 
Davidson, Lighthall, Waite, & Ruebush, 1960; Taylor, 1953). Researchers in 
educational psychology also identified two subcomponents of the anxiety response, a 
cognitive component, termed worry, and a physiological component, termed 
emotionality (Liebert & Morris, 1967). Sport psychologists responded to these 
developments and constructed measurement instruments to assess the 
multidimensional nature of the state anxiety response (Martens, Burton, Vealey, 
Bump, & Smith, 1990). In the development of the Competitive State Anxiety 
Inventory-2 (CSAI-2), Martens, Burton, et al. adopted the definitions of worry or 
cognitive anxiety, and emotionality or somatic anxiety, used by Morris, Davis and 
Hutchings (1981). According to Morris et al., cognitive anxiety refers to "negative 
expectations and cognitive concerns about oneself, the situation at hand, and 
potential consequences" (p. 541). Morris et al. defined somatic anxiety as "one's 
perception of the physiological-affective elements of the anxiety experience, that is, 
indications of autonomic arousal and unpleasant feeling states such as nervousness 
and tension" (p. 541). It is also generally accepted that in the context of sport, 
cognitive anxiety is manifested by negative expectations of success and the resultant 
negative self-evaluation that may trigger several types of negative mental 
consequences. According to Burton (1998), these include (a) negative thoughts such 
as worry, (b) images of failure and other disturbing evaluation-related imagery, (c) 
distraction preventing appropriate attentional focus, and (d) control problems ranging 
from feeling totally overwhelmed to slight feelings of loss of control (p. 131). 
According to Burton, somatic anxiety reflects perceptions about the physiological 
and affective elements of the anxiety response emanating from the autonomic 
arousal process. This definition contrasts with that offered by Martens, Burton, et al., 
in which somatic anxiety refers to the physiological symptoms themselves. Burton's 
definition would appear to be the more logical of the two as perceptions of 
physiological symptoms afford the opportunity of measurement using self-report 
instruments, such as the CSAI-2. 
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Arousal and activation 
Most sport psychology textbooks refer to arousal or activation as a single unitary 
construct that incorporates physiological and psychological aspects of behaviour. 
Furthermore, adding to the conceptual ambiguity, the terms arousal and activation 
are often used synonymously. Duffy (1962) defined arousal as "the extent of release 
of potential energy, stored in the tissues of the organism, as this is shown in activity 
or response" (p. 179). Unidimensional conceptualisations of arousal and activation 
responses were called into question by Lacey (1967), who presented evidence for 
multidimensional responses. As a result, a number of researchers suggested that it is 
necessary to view arousal and activation in more detail by examining the different 
systems involved in performance (Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Näätänen, 1973; 
Neiss, 1988). Adopting a multidimensional approach to the study of arousal and 
activation, Pribram and McGuiness (1975) identified three distinct but interacting 
neurophysiological systems involved in the control of attention. The three 
energetical components of Pribram and McGuiness' model were arousal, defined as 
the organism's immediate response to some new input; activation, defined as the 
organism's readiness to respond; and effort, responsible for co-ordinating the arousal 
and activation resource pools. Using Pribram and McGuiness' model, Hardy, Jones, 
et al. (1996) have advocated a clearer distinction between arousal and activation in 
the sport psychology literature. Hardy, Jones, et al. distinguished between activation, 
referring to the cognitive and physiological activity geared towards the preparation 
of a planned response to an anticipated situation, and arousal, referring to the 
cognitive and physiological activity that takes place in response to some new input. 
For example, picture a golfer preparing to attempt a potentially match-winning putt. 
If the golfer is highly skilled, they probably possess the appropriate activation state 
for performing the putt successfully. If, however, a spectator suddenly shouts out at 
the very moment the golfer starts the backswing of the putt, the golfer may 
experience an involuntary startle (arousal) response, leading to a disruption of the 
practised activation pattern. The different activation pattern may cause the golfer to 
miss the putt. The various distinctions made above are important in terms of theory, 
research design and applied implications. 
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Potential Explanations of how Anxiety Affects Performance 
Traditional approaches to explaining the anxiety-performance relationship have 
relied upon attentional mechanisms (Easterbrook, 1959; Wine, 1980). These early 
theories will be addressed briefly before examining contemporary work based upon 
more sophisticated attentional explanations (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Humphreys & 
Revelle, 1984) and alternative explanations for anxiety effects, grounded in self- 
focus mechanisms (Masters, 1992b; Wegner, 1994). 
Easterbrook's Cue Utilisation Theory 
Easterbrook (1959) reviewed a large body of literature concerning the effects of 
emotional arousal on perceptual selectivity. Easterbrook concluded that increases in 
emotional arousal consistently narrowed the range of cue utilisation in task 
performance. Easterbrook used a very broad definition of arousal, describing it as, 
The innate response to a state of biological deprivation or noxious 
stimulation, which underlies or occurs simultaneously with overt 
action and affects its strength and course. This emotional arousal is 
greater in neurotic than in normal subjects, greater than usual in 
subjects under stress or threat or in frustration, and in general greater 
in animals that have been motivated by any of the usual deprivations, 
noxious stimulations or other incentives than it is in unmotivated or 
resting animals of the same species. (p. 184) 
Anxiety appears to be one aspect of this emotional arousal dimension. In the context 
of the competitive anxiety response, the emotional arousal described above 
presumably refers to the physiological arousal that underpins the somatic anxiety 
response. According to Eysenck (1982; 1992), Easterbrook argued that high 
emotionality, arousal and anxiety all produced comparable effects upon cue 
utilisation. Easterbrook noted that individuals detect visual information from a 
variety of sources, some of which are relevant, and others that are not. In sports, for 
example, the relative positioning of opponents is a relevant cue, while the movement 
of the crowd would be irrelevant to task performance. Easterbrook claimed that the 
range of cues used by individuals reduces as anxiety, and therefore emotional 
arousal, increases. At low levels of anxiety a wide range of cues are detected, 
including irrelevant cues, and this lack of selectivity results in relatively poor 
performance (Figure 1, below). At moderate levels of arousal or anxiety, the range of 
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cues available to the performers is reduced and performance is subsequently 
maximised. At higher levels of anxiety or arousal, continued narrowing of the 
attentional field leads to the exclusion of task-relevant cues and performance 
deteriorates. 
0-0 task-irrelevant cues 
+-+task-relevant cues 
000000000000000000000 
+++++++++++++++++++++ 
++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++++++++++++++++++++ 
Optimal performance region 
without over- or under-inclusion 
of task-relevant and irrelevant 
cues, respectively 
++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++++++++++++++++++++ 
++++++:, c ++++++++++++++ 
000000000000000000000 
attentional field 
Low Moderate High 
Arousal / Anxiety Level 
Figure 1. Peripheral narrowing as a potential explanation of the arousal/anxiety- 
relationship (Source: Abernethy, 1993, p. 134). 
Despite the intuitive appeal of Easterbrook's theory, Eysenck (1982) suggested that 
tests of the theory provide less than convincing support, claiming that the dual task 
paradigm commonly employed to test the theory was biased. As Eysenck pointed 
out, "There are nine possible combinations of main-task and subsidiary task 
performance, only three of which are clearly incompatible with Easterbrook's 
hypothesis. " (p. 50). Furthermore, Easterbrook claimed that the attentional 
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narrowing associated with high anxiety was a passive and automatic process. 
Eysenck (1992) questioned the automaticity of this response, suggesting that any 
narrowing may be an active-coping response. In their attempts to cope, anxious 
individuals may strategically attempt to ensure task success by restricting their 
limited processing resources to a small proportion of the information available. In a 
similar vein, Hockey and Hamilton (1983) supported Easterbrook's view that high 
arousal produces a "monotonic increase in the selectivity of attention" (p. 339). 
However, Hockey and Hamilton suggested that increases in selectivity are more 
likely to be associated with a bias in the intake of information from dominant or high 
priority sources. 
In the context of anxiety, Eysenck (1982) highlighted two further questionable 
aspects of Easterbrook's hypothesis. Firstly, Eysenck noted that elevated anxiety 
results in a lack of ability to concentrate on the task at hand, rather than the intense 
concentration implied by cue utilisation theory. This is reflected in anxious 
individuals' tendency to appear to spend more time engaged in off-task glancing. 
Secondly, Eysenck questioned Easterbrook's implicit assumption that anxious 
individuals should be less distractible than non-anxious individuals. Eysenck (1992) 
reviewed a large body of literature supporting the notion that anxiety can lead to 
increased rather than decreased distractibility. 
Despite these criticisms, Landers, Wang, and Courtet (1985) found partial 
support for attentional narrowing with rifle shooters. More recently, however, 
Janelle, Singer and Williams (1999) specifically addressed the selectivity - 
distractibility question using a dual-task motor racing simulation. Participants 
performed a central driving task under conditions of low and high anxiety, while 
responding to peripheral cues. Janelle et al. found evidence to support both 
attentional narrowing and distraction. Williams and Elliott (1999) found 
improvements in the performance of cognitively anxious participants engaged in a 
simulated karate task. Visual search data collected under high and low anxiety 
conditions indicated that anxious participants increased their search rate and the 
amount of time spent fixating on peripheral display areas. The data could be 
explained using either attentional narrowing or distractibility. It appears from the 
recent evidence that an increase in attentional selectivity is unable to provide a 
complete picture of how anxiety affects performance. As Hockey and Hamilton 
(1983) noted, however, researchers should not be misled into believing that 
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selectivity is the key to arousal / anxiety effects. Rather, attentional selectivity might 
be better considered as part of a more complex puzzle. 
Easterbrook's theory has several practical implications. According to Eysenck 
(1992), Easterbrook claimed that arousal, anxiety and emotionality all produce 
comparable effects upon cue utilisation. This suggests that performers require 
strategies to enable them to deal with these effects, which cause "tunnel vision". 
However, as Hockey and Hamilton (1983) and Eysenck (1992) have suggested, the 
tunnel vision caused by responses to stressors may be a strategic response used by 
performers to focus upon the perceptual cues they perceive to be important. As such, 
coaches and sport psychologists might attempt to identify which cues performers 
perceive to be important. Hardy, Jones, et al. (1996) use the example of a soccer 
player who fails to mark opponents consistently "when `psyched up' in `big games' 
because he `ball watches', i. e. focuses all his attention on the ball, instead of the 
players he is supposed to mark" (p. 120). Hardy, Jones, et al. suggest that the player 
might be re-educated by helping him to understand the spatial relationship between 
himself, the ball, and the opponents he is supposed to mark. Performers might also 
be taught quick relaxation strategies that can be used during performance to lower 
arousal levels. Hardy, Jones, et al. also suggest that performers might learn task- 
specific cues that help to maintain an appropriate focus of attention when they 
become highly aroused. 
In summary, Easterbrook's cue utilisation theory predicts that an increase in 
emotional arousal impairs performance by narrowing the range of task-specific cue 
utilisation. Low levels of arousal result in reduced selectivity and a wide range of 
cues, including task-irrelevant cues, are detected, impairing performance. Moderate 
levels of arousal facilitate performance by limiting the range of cue utilisation to 
optimal levels, such that only task-relevant cues are detected. Further increases in 
arousal impair performance by further reducing the range of cues detected, such that 
some task-relevant cues remain undetected. Despite limitations with Easterbrook's 
theory (Eysenck, 1982,1992), it does appear that attentional selectivity might have a 
role to play in explaining how arousal and anxiety affect performance. 
Cognitive Interference Theory 
Like Easterbrook (1959), Wine (1971; 1980) and Sarason (1984; 1988) also 
suggested that attentional processes mediate the effects of anxiety upon task 
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performance. Rather than emphasise a peripheral narrowing of attention, cognitive 
interference models of anxiety-related performance impairment focus upon the 
possibility that the critical restriction in information processing capacity occurs 
centrally within the cognitive system. Such accounts typically attribute this reduction 
in central cognitive capacity to the effects of task-irrelevant processing. According to 
cognitive interference theory, task irrelevant processing is hypothesised to consist of 
worry and self-preoccupation, which serve to divert attention away from task- 
relevant thoughts. For example, thoughts such as "I'm bound to fail, I'm not as good 
as the others". Wine (1980) cites several further examples of ways in which high 
anxious individuals tend to be negatively self-preoccupied in comparison with low 
anxious individuals. High anxious individuals report a higher frequency of task- 
irrelevant thoughts, are more likely to self-attribute task failure, to set lower levels of 
aspiration, even when actual performance does not differ, and to have less 
confidence in perceptual judgements. This type of self-preoccupation is attributed to 
the construct of worry, rather than to emotionality. Kroll (1982) produced evidence 
that task-irrelevant thoughts were associated with competitive athletic situations. 
Such thoughts interfere with attention to current tasks, and it therefore follows that 
anxiety has larger adverse effects upon tasks requiring most attention. 
Empirical research has generally supported the hypothesis that cognitive anxiety 
is strongly negatively related to performance in both academic (Deffenbacher, 1980; 
Morris et al., 1981) and sport (Burton, 1998) domains. Researchers have concluded 
that reducing cognitive anxiety can effectively enhance performance. Martens, 
Vealey, et al. (1990), Morris et al., and Wine (1980) proposed that cognitive anxiety 
can be reduced in several ways: (a) by creating positive expectations of success, (b) 
by eliminating distracting negative thoughts and self-rumination, and (c) by 
preventing excessive analysis and evaluation that inhibit flow. However, Burton 
(1990) has suggested that reducing cognitive anxiety may not be sufficient to 
improve performance. Burton suggested that it might also be necessary to reduce 
somatic anxiety in order for cognitive interventions to work effectively. More recent 
evidence presented by Hardy and Parfitt (1991) and Hardy, Parfitt, and Pates (1994) 
has also indicated that high levels of cognitive anxiety are not always detrimental to 
performance. 
Eysenck (1992) has criticised Wine and Sarason's theoretical approach in several 
ways. Firstly, according to Eysenck, cognitively anxious individuals do not always 
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suffer performance impairment in comparison with their low-anxious counterparts 
(Calvo, Alamo, & Ramos, 1990; Calvo & Ramos, 1989). Secondly, Eysenck 
contends that both Wine and Sarason have over-simplified their accounts of the 
interaction between task difficulty and anxiety. Specifically, Eysenck noted that 
"task difficulty appears to be equated with the amount of attentional resources 
required by a task. This has the undesirable consequence that transformational and 
storage processes are ignored" (p. 127). 
In summary, cognitive interference theory proposes that performance impairment 
in anxious performers is caused by task-irrelevant processing hypothesised to consist 
of worry and self-preoccupation that diverts attention away from task-relevant cues. 
As with Easterbrook's cue utilisation theory, however, the effects of distraction upon 
performance appear to provide only a partial account of the effects of anxiety upon 
performance. 
Humphreys and Revelle's Information Processing Model 
Humphreys and Revelle (1984) proposed a theory that considered the effects of 
anxiety upon performance in information processing terms. The advantage of the 
model proposed by Humphreys and Revelle over cognitive interference theories is 
that tasks can be categorised in terms of sustained information transfer and short- 
term memory. Sustained information transfer (SIT) involves an individual processing 
a stimulus, associating a response to the stimulus, and executing a response. 
Furthermore, there is no attempt at retaining this information in memory. For 
example, a soccer goalkeeper making a reaction save. Short-term memory (STM) 
tasks are those tasks where information is maintained in an available state or 
retrieved when it has not been attended to for a while. For example, deciding where 
to deliver the next corner kick in a soccer match. 
A further advantage of Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) model over cue 
utilisation and cognitive interference theories is that performance, at the level of 
information processing, can be predicted by the combined effects of: selected 
personality dimensions (achievement motivation, trait anxiety, impulsivity); 
motivational states (approach motivation, avoidance motivation); and situational 
moderators (stressors). The relationship between these mechanisms and two further 
key systems, arousal and on-task effort is depicted in Figure 2 (below). Arousal was 
defined by Humphreys and Revelle as "that factor common to various indicants of 
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alertness" (p. 158). This conceptualisation is unidimensional in nature and clearly a 
major drawback with Humphreys and Revelle's model. On-task effort is defined by 
Humphreys and Revelle as "the motivational state commonly understood to mean 
trying hard ... (and) is increased when the subject tries harder, when there are 
incentives to perform well, or when the task is important or difficult" (p. 158). As 
noted by Jones (1990), the notion of "on-task effort" is more specific than the 
general feeling of trying hard as it refers to the allocation resources to the task at 
hand. 
A key feature of the model proposed by Humphreys and Revelle (1984) is the 
suggestion that the SIT and STM tasks outlined above are differentially affected by 
arousal and on-task effort. For SIT tasks, increases in arousal and on-task effort 
produce an increase in the number of resources available to sustain skills. As 
Humphreys and Revelle also proposed that performance increases monotonically as 
a function of the number of resources applied, increases in both arousal and on-task 
effort should therefore improve SIT performance. STM tasks, on the other hand, are 
adversely affected by increases in arousal. 
Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) model also includes predictions concerning the 
interactions between the three personality dimensions (Figure 2, above), on-task 
effort, and arousal and specific task requirements. In terms of explaining how 
anxiety affects performance, Humphreys and Revelle suggest that state anxiety has a 
cognitive component, worry, which is equated with avoidance motivation. 
According to the authors, avoidance motivation produces a subsequent decrease in 
allocated task resources, or on-task effort. Tasks with a high short-term memory 
component are therefore more adversely affected by high state anxiety. As a result, 
high levels of state anxiety, with the associated worry component, interfere with 
attention and reduce on-task effort, impairing performance on both SIT and STM 
tasks. 
Despite the advantages of looking at the effects of different stressors upon 
specific components of performance, Eysenck (1992) notes several limitations of 
Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) model. The first of Eysenck's major criticisms 
concerns the unidimensional conceptualisation of arousal proposed by Humphreys 
and Revelle. A unidimensional view of arousal is in conflict with the notion of 
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multidimensional activation states and arousal espoused earlier. However, in spite of 
these criticisms, the differential performance effects predicted by Humphreys and 
Revelle's model are an advance on unidimensional theorists' conceptualisation of a 
single arousal system that affects general performance in a curvilinear fashion. 
Eysenck also criticises Humphreys and Revelle's failure to include a control system 
within their model. According to Eysenck, a control system should be responsible 
for monitoring and adjusting the functioning of the information processing system. 
Eysenck suggests that a control system would be responsible for initially recognising 
and subsequently compensating for specified effects upon information processing. 
Eysenck's third major criticism concerns the hypothesis that state anxiety promotes 
avoidance motivation, which reduces on-task effort, "overestimates the negative 
motivational influence of anxiety" (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992, p. 412). Eysenck and 
Calvo expand on this criticism by noting that both Calvo (1985) and Eysenck (1985) 
have produced empirical evidence supporting the contention that performance is not 
always impaired on tasks with substantial short-term memory demands. Eysenck 
also criticises the short-term storage system incorporated within the model. 
According to Eysenck, the short-term memory system proposed by Humphreys and 
Revelle is inadequate and inconsistent with the more complex multi-component 
system proposed by Baddeley (1986) and Baddeley and Hitch (1974). 
In terms of practical implications for coaches and performers, Humphreys and 
Revelle's model suggests that the same psychological skills are unlikely to be 
appropriate for all individuals. As the model predicts different responses by 
individuals to specific situations and also differential performance on different types 
of skills, psychological skills training should be sensitive to such differences. 
Multimodal stress management strategies (Burton, 1990; Meichenbaum, 1977) may 
be appropriate in this context. 
In summary, Humphreys and Revelle's model attempts to predict the combined 
effects of personality and motivational variables upon SIT and STM components of 
performance. Humphreys and Revelle predict that high arousal enhances SIT 
performance but impairs STM performance. Elevated anxiety is predicted to 
negatively influence both SIT and STM. Humphreys and Revelle's dual-system 
approach, while extending the theoretical scope of earlier theories, is hindered by a 
number of limitations, not least of which is the lack of empirical evidence upon 
14 
which the theory is based. 
Eysenck and Calvo's Processing Efficiency Theory 
Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) cognitively derived processing efficiency theory might 
have important implications for sport psychology. Central to Eysenck and Calvo's 
theory is the relationship between cognitive anxiety and performance. Cognitive 
anxiety is hypothesised to affect performance by demanding cognitive resources, 
which are located within a multidimensional working memory system (Baddeley, 
1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). As cognitive anxiety is predicted to affect the 
working memory system, tasks with little or no working memory component should 
not be affected by increases in cognitive anxiety. Processing efficiency theory thus 
accounts for the Anxiety x Task Difficulty interaction (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). 
Processing efficiency theory also predicts that cognitively anxious individuals can 
maintain the quality of task performance. According to Eysenck and Calvo, high 
cognitive anxiety can serve a motivational function. Eysenck and Calvo proposed a 
monitoring or control system that reacts to feedback indicating that performance is 
falling below the level desired by the individual. The monitoring system reacts to 
poor performance by allocating extra resources to the task at hand, thus maintaining 
performance at an acceptable level. In this respect, Eysenck and Calvo's distinction 
between performance effectiveness and processing efficiency is important. 
Performance effectiveness simply refers to the quality of task performance. 
Processing efficiency refers to the "relationship between the effectiveness of 
performance and the effort or amount of processing resources invested" (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992, p. 417). The distinction is important in explaining the maintenance of 
task performance under stress. Processing efficiency theory predicts differential 
effects upon processing efficiency and performance effectiveness as anxious 
individuals generally make more use of the control system and so exert more effort. 
According to Eysenck and Calvo, anxiety therefore affects processing efficiency 
more than performance effectiveness. Eysenck (1992) has reviewed a large number 
of studies that support the predictions outlined above. The empirical evidence 
reviewed by Eysenck was largely based upon cognitive tasks such as letter 
transformation and reading, and as Eysenck (1996) has noted, it is not clear how 
important worry is in influencing performance on motor tasks. As such, it may be 
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unreasonable to expect the findings from test anxiety research to be applied en bloc 
to competitive sport contexts. However, Hardy and Jackson (1996) examined the 
performance of experienced rock climbers who led and seconded high and low 
anxiety rock climbs. Climbers performed better and exerted more cognitive and 
physiological effort when they were cognitively anxious (leading) compared to when 
they were not cognitively anxious (seconding). Sport tasks similar to rock climbing 
that tax working memory, may be more susceptible to the effects predicted by 
Eysenck and Calvo. Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (1998) also found moderate support 
for processing efficiency theory. Using seven point scales, University volleyball 
players who reported performance worries were asked to rate how frequently the 
worries were reported, the degree to which these thoughts disrupted concentration 
("distraction"), and the degree to which these thoughts influenced subsequent effort 
("effort"). Using path analysis, the authors found support for the contention that the 
"frequency" of cognitive interference was negatively associated with performance, 
which was also measured using a seven point rating scale. Hatzigeorgiadis and 
Biddle found that the frequency of negative thoughts might lead participants to 
increase the amount of effort invested in the task. However, multi-sample analysis 
also revealed that the level of expectancy moderated the effect of worry upon 
performance. Favourable expectancies might result in extra resources being applied 
to the task, whereas worry and low expectancy "might discourage individuals, 
resulting in withdrawal of effort" (p. 127). 
Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (1998) included expectancy in their test of 
processing efficiency theory based upon suggestions made by Carver and Scheier 
(1988) who suggested that the key to whether or not an individual persisted with, or 
disengaged from, a task was their confidence about achieving their goals. Although 
Eyenck and Calvo (1992) say little about the exact circumstances under which 
anxious individuals will invest more effort, Eysenck (1982) had previously 
suggested that the amount of effort expended by an individual was an evaluation of 
task demands. According to Eysenck, "if an anxious person believes that the 
probability of reducing anxiety through successful task performance is very low, 
then anxiety will lead to a low investment of effort in the task" (p. 109). Eysenck 
cited the work of Revelle and Michaels (1976), who hypothesised that motivation is 
affected by the subjective probability of task success, proposing the following 
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relationship between the two variables: "Moderately difficult problems or situations 
... should be extremely motivating 
('When the going gets tough, the tough get 
going'). On the other hand, very difficult or impossible tasks ... should 
lead to 
extremely low levels of motivation ('Wise people do not beat their heads against 
brick walls')" (Revelle & Michaels, 1976, p. 402). Additionally, Hardy (1990; 
1996b) suggested that the construct of self-confidence may be an important variable 
that might "protect" against the debilitating effects of high state anxiety. Hardy 
(1990; 1996b) also hypothesised that processing efficiency theory might dovetail 
with the predictions of catastrophe models of anxiety and performance (for a full 
consideration, see Hardy, 1990,1996). The role of expectancies and self-confidence 
in facilitating the allocation of extra resources to the task at hand could help clarify 
the compensatory role of effort in processing efficiency theory. 
In summary, processing efficiency theory distinguishes between performance 
effectiveness and processing efficiency. Performance effectiveness may be impaired 
under high anxiety by worry consuming attentional resources located in the working 
memory system. The main advantage of processing efficiency theory over other 
theories is the inclusion of a control system that allows anxious performers to offset 
the negative effects of high anxiety by applying extra resources to tasks, thus 
impairing processing efficiency. The exact circumstances under which anxious 
individuals apply extra resources require further clarification. Further research 
examining processing efficiency theory remains a priority within sport psychology. 
Wegner's Theory of Ironic Processes of Mental Control 
Wegner (1989; 1994) developed the theory of ironic processes of mental control 
from the observation that the mind wanders because we try to control it. Wegner 
(1989) cites Dostoyevsky's example of trying, and failing, to suppress a thought of a 
white polar bear as an example of an ironic process. Wegner suggested that mental 
control results from the interaction of two processes, an intentional operating 
process, and an ironic monitoring process. The intentional operating process 
searches for mental contents that will result in the desired mental state. The 
intentional operating process is effortful, conscious, effective, and interruptible. The 
ironic monitoring process searches for mental contents that signal the failure to 
achieve the desired state and is usually unconscious, less demanding of mental 
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effort, and uninterruptible. For example, prior to taking a penalty kick in soccer, the 
operating process might look for any signs that will allow the player to successfully 
take the penalty kick. Such signs might include picking a target area in the goal, 
reminding oneself that the goalkeeper has a weaker left-hand side, or remembering 
the last successful penalty kick. At the same time the ironic monitoring process 
might look for signs that will result in an unsuccessful kick. These might include 
recalling where the ball went the last time one missed the goal, or remembering that 
the goalkeeper has a good track record saving penalties. 
The monitoring process is functionally adaptive in that it normally ensures that 
any threat to the operating system is registered and dealt with appropriately. In the 
example of a penalty kick, the monitoring process might register that the goalkeeper 
is stronger to his or her right side and, normally, the penalty-taker should be able to 
direct the penalty to the goalkeeper's left side. Unfortunately, ironic control 
problems may arise under conditions of mental load. Normally, the operating 
process functions effectively by consuming attentional resources (assumed to be of 
limited capacity, cf. Kahneman, 1973), while the monitoring process functions at a 
subconscious level and, as such, is less effortful than the conscious operating 
system. Under increased mental load, for example, when an individual is cognitively 
anxious, interference at the cognitive level consumes attentional resources being 
used by the operating process. As a result the monitoring process becomes more 
dominant and mental control paradoxically works against itself by attending to those 
thoughts that are least desirable (the contents of the monitoring system). In the case 
of the penalty-taker, the last missed penalty becomes the fixated thought. "Don't hit 
the ball too close to the `keeper" results in the player mis-cueing his kick, which 
goes straight at the goalkeeper. 
Research into ironic effects is sparse within sport psychology. Wegner, Ansfield, 
and Pilloff (1998) examined golf putting performance under conditions of mental 
load. Wegner et al. found that players who were instructed not to hit the ball past the 
hole were more likely to do so. The central tenets of Wegner's theory were also 
supported by Wegner, Broome and Blumberg (1997), who found that people who 
attempted to relax under conditions of mental load demonstrated an increase in 
symptoms of anxiety and physiological arousal. 
In terms of applied implications, little has been written about preventing or 
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changing ironic processes within sport psychology. In the field of clinical 
psychology, Wegner (1997) and Shoham and Rohrbaugh (1997) suggested that 
paradoxical interventions might provide a means of interrupting ironic processes. 
Janelle (1999) provides some detail on how paradoxical interventions might function 
in a sporting environment. According to Janelle, asking athletes to focus on their 
anxious competitive feelings should trigger the monitoring process to initiate a 
search for signs that are incompatible with the anxious state. Janelle suggests that in 
this manner, relaxation can be induced through ironic identification of relaxation 
strategies by the monitoring process. However, as Hall, Hardy, and Gammage 
(1999) point out, paradoxical interventions should probably be viewed with caution 
in view of their counterintuitive quality and the lack of empirical evidence that 
supports them. 
In summary, Wegner's theory of ironic processes suggests that mental control is 
achieved via the interaction of an intentional operating process and an ironic 
monitoring process. Under conditions of high cognitive load, the monitoring process 
supersedes the operating process and leads individuals to focus on the aspect of 
behaviour they have been seeking to avoid. 
Masters' Conscious Processing Hypothesis 
According to Baumeister (1984), paradoxical performance effects, or "the 
occurrence of inferior performance despite incentives and striving for superior 
performance" (Baumeister & Showers, 1986, p. 361), are a common result of 
competition. The concept of paradoxical performance is not new. The Bliss-Boder 
hypothesis, derived from early work by Bliss (1893) and Boder (1935), suggested 
that performance impairment is caused by competition which leads individuals to 
consciously monitor performance. Deikman (1966) termed this effect 
"deautomatisation", which involves the undoing of automatisation by reinvesting 
actions with attention. Eysenck (1982) believed that deautomatisation could occur 
even in everyday skills: "For example, if you think too deeply about the leg 
movements involved in walking down a flight of stairs, you may well finish up in a 
heap at the bottom of those stairs! " (p. 13). 
Empirical evidence for the deleterious effect of task-focus upon the performance 
of well-learned or "overlearned" skills has been provided by Kimble and Perlmuter 
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(1970) and Langer and Imber (1979). Vallacher (1993) believed that self-focus 
causes an exaggerated concern with the mechanics underlying task execution, 
disrupting fluidity and rhythm. Reason (1984) suggested that such task disruption 
was the result of being in the wrong control mode with respect to current task 
demands. Reason claimed that errors often occur as a result of "going closed loop 
during the execution of a highly automated sequence of actions for which 
intervention by the intention system is both unnecessary and undesirable" (p. 536). 
Masters (1992b) sought to explain the effects of anxiety upon motor 
performance from the premise that "failure of expert motor skill is common in cases 
where performers are highly motivated to succeed and that one cause of this can be 
an inward focus of attention in which an attempt is made to perform the skill by 
consciously processing explicit knowledge of how it works" (p. 14, emphasis 
added). Central to this "conscious processing hypothesis" is a distinction between 
expert and novice task control. Where individuals are highly skilled, a concern for 
the mechanics of a particular motor skill is largely redundant for successful 
performance. As Vallacher (1993) noted, "Consciousness can be overdone, 
functioning to subvert as well as facilitate effective action. " (p. 140). The theoretical 
basis for making such claims lies in the notion of stages of learning, central to 
cognitive (Fitts & Posner, 1967) and ecological (Newell, 1985) approaches to motor 
learning. One of the central features of cognitive theories of motor learning is the 
role of attention in task control. Conscious attentional processes are thought to guide 
performance early in learning. As a result, performance is inconsistent, slow, erratic 
and jerky. 
One of the reasons for the deliberate performance of the novice might be that 
verbal information, typically provided by coaches, has to be "translated" into the 
"language" of the action processes responsible for task performance. Annett (1991) 
suggests that such translation is achieved via "action and language" bridges. Figure 
3 (below) illustrates Annett's ideas. The top of the diagram shows different kinds of 
input, words and actions. The central section (the four boxes) represents internal 
processes, while the bottom represents output as actions or words. The left-hand side 
represents the non-verbal domain of action, while the right-hand side represents the 
verbal domain. The upper pair of the four areas in the centre represents receptive and 
interpretive processes, while the bottom pair represents productive processes. Annett 
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describes a number of routes through the diagram; the most typical of which is from 
the top straight down in the conventional direction of perception to action. Other 
routes involve crossover between the verbal and non-verbal routes. In particular, a 
novice learning a motor skill has to transform verbal instruction from coaches into a 
language that can be used by motor processes and also translate the internal coding 
of the movement that may initially be verbally coded. 
Human actions Verbal instructions 
Perceptual Perceptual 
processes processes 
Motor Motor 
processes processes 
Actions Speech 
Figure 3. Annett's (1991) hypothetical relationships between motor and verbal 
systems. 
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By way of contrast, the performance of the expert is largely thought to be 
automatic or unconscious. In the context of Annett's framework, the expert is 
relatively free from the problem of finding crossover links between language and 
action. Hours of practice lead to a state where performance is relatively automatic, 
taking place with little conscious attention or mental effort. As a result, in describing 
the final stage of learning, Fitts and Posner used the label "autonomous" to describe 
the relatively attention-free functioning of the expert. Once again, this idea is not 
new, with James (1890) noting that "Habit diminishes the conscious attention with 
which our acts are performed. " (p. 114). The sport psychology literature is replete 
with anecdotal examples and empirical evidence for the automatic, effortlessly 
processed performance of experts. For example, Tony Meola, an international soccer 
goalkeeper, claimed that "When I'm really concentrating, I would say it's almost 
like I'm playing unconscious. " (Newman, 1992, p. 95). The late Ayrton Senna, 
describing an experience that occurred during practice for the Monaco grand prix in 
1988, provided an extreme example of automatic functioning: 
Monte Carlo '88, the last qualifying session. I was already on pole 
and I was going faster and faster ... Suddenly I was nearly two 
seconds faster than anybody else, including my team-mate with the 
same car. And suddenly I realised that I was no longer driving the car 
consciously. I was driving it by a kind of instinct, only I was in a 
different dimension. It was like I was in a tunnel ... I was way over 
the limit but still able to find even more. Then suddenly something 
just kicked me ... my immediate reaction was to back off, slow down. I drove slowly back to the pits and I didn't want to go out 
anymore that day. (Williams, 1995, pp. 98-99) 
Sport psychologists have also collected empirical data supporting such anecdotes 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Jackson, 1992). 
The distinction between automatic and controlled processing (Schneider, 
Dumais, & Shiffrin, 1984; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) 
is fundamental to the conscious processing hypothesis. Controlled processes are 
thought to underlie the inconsistent performance of the novice. Controlled 
processing is attention demanding and effortful, serial in nature, slow, and can be 
subject to conscious modification (Abernethy, 1993). Automatic processing on the 
other hand appears to be largely without conscious demand or effort, parallel in 
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nature, fast, and difficult to modify once initiated (Abernethy, 1993). This 
distinction is popularly used in the sport psychology literature to describe the 
apparent release from effortful processing that accompanies motor learning. 
A further feature of skill acquisition central to Masters' (1992b) conscious 
processing hypothesis is the change in knowledge structures thought to underpin 
performance at early and late stages of learning. According to Anderson's (1982) 
Active Control of Thought (ACT) theory, expertise is developed by a transition from 
control by declarative knowledge to control by procedural knowledge. Declarative, 
or explicit knowledge, is thought to underpin the conscious control of the novice. 
Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge of facts, that is knowing "what to do" in a 
specific situation. Explicit knowledge is rule-based, available to consciousness, and 
verbalisable (Reber, 1993). Procedural knowledge is hypothesised to be used later in 
learning. Procedural knowledge is concerned with "how to do" something and is 
abstract, unavailable to consciousness, and nonverbalisable (Reber, 1993). Central to 
Anderson's theory, which it must be noted concerns the acquisition of cognitive 
rather than motor skills, is the premise that all incoming knowledge is coded 
explicitly or declaratively. The declarative codings are accessed step-by-step by a 
procedure subject to capacity limits and under conscious control. With practice, a 
production system develops that replaces the interpretive application with 
productions that perform behaviours quickly and directly without conscious 
awareness. The shift from declarative to procedural knowledge and the concomitant 
"dropping out" of consciousness is consistent with the view of automaticity 
developed earlier. The interpretive application of declarative knowledge suggested 
by Anderson, occurs early in learning and might be illustrated by the crossover links 
from verbal to action processes in Figure 3. Furthermore, Anderson's theory also 
appears to fit in well with Annett's ideas on action-language bridges. A further key 
mechanism that might help explain the attention-free performance of the expert is 
"chunking". According to Neves and Anderson (1981), the development of expertise 
is the result of a gradual chunking of independent components of a task. Through 
practice, the individual task components are incorporated into larger chunks, which 
can be handled as a single representation of the task. The chunking process may help 
explain how expert task performance appears smooth and efficient, whereas that of 
the novice appears jerky and segmented. 
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The notions of automatic and controlled processing, "chunking", and Anderson's 
ACT theory of learning are all central to Masters' (1992b) conscious processing 
hypothesis. According to Masters, increased state anxiety leads performers to focus 
their attention inwards in an attempt to control movement using explicit or 
declarative knowledge about the skill. Masters termed this process "reinvestment" of 
explicit knowledge. By reinvesting in their explicit knowledge base, performers are 
relying upon knowledge used to guide performance during the early stages of 
learning. As a result, the conscious processing hypothesis suggests that the 
underlying mechanisms used to guide performance also shift from the smooth, 
unconscious, automatic processing of the expert, to the erratic, deliberate, controlled 
processing of the novice. Referring to Figure 3, the direct path through the left-hand 
side of the model via action-oriented receptive and interpretive processes and 
productive processes is disrupted by state anxiety. The conscious processing 
hypothesis suggests that anxious performers might revert to using conscious verbal 
receptive and interpretive processes to generate action-oriented productive processes 
via the action-language bridge. Thus, referring to Figure 3, anxious performers 
might attempt to use the cognitively oriented perceptual processes on the right-hand 
side of the model to guide the motor processes found on the other side of the 
"bridge". Automatic processing thus becomes subverted by the conscious 
mechanisms associated with the performance of the novice, typically with disastrous 
consequences. 
Masters' (1992b) ideas regarding conscious processing also dovetail neatly with 
Fitts, Bahrick, Noble and Briggs' (1961) progression-regression hypothesis which 
suggested that learning produces a progression to complex control strategies that are 
underpinned by higher-order kinematic derivatives. During the "regression" phase of 
the progression-regression hypothesis, individuals under stress are hypothesised to 
regress to using more basic task control strategies centred upon lower-order 
kinematic parameters, that is, time-position information. More recently, Lee and 
Swinnen (1993) noted that the progression-regression hypothesis might be useful in 
describing the acquisition and breakdown of motor skills. MacMahon and Masters 
(1998) have produced empirical evidence supporting the progression and regression 
phases of Fitts et al's. (1961) hypothesis using the notion of chunking discussed 
earlier. Using a serial reaction time task, MacMahon and Masters demonstrated that 
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learning resulted in chunking of separate task components into larger, functional 
units. In a subsequent high anxiety condition, performance regressed or "de- 
chunked" from the larger, functional units into the smaller, separate task 
components. 
The role of self-focus as a dispositional variable has also received some attention 
in the conscious processing literature. Masters, Polman and Hammond (1993) 
examined the suggestion that reinvestment might be a dimension of personality, with 
some individuals more predisposed than others to reinvest actions with attention. 
Masters et al. devised the Reinvestment Scale to measure individuals' predisposition 
to focus attention on the mechanics of movements. The Reinvestment Scale has been 
shown to be internally reliable with an alpha coefficient of 0.80 and a test-retest 
correlation coefficient of 0.74 (Masters et al., 1993). In terms of validity, however, 
the evidence presented by Masters et al. was not strong. Masters et al. were unable to 
find causal evidence supporting the notion that high reinvesters were more likely 
than low reinvesters to experience performance decrements under pressure. Despite 
this criticism, dispositional self-focus may still be important in the context of 
conscious processing. Baumeister (1984) suggested that individuals high in 
dispositional self-consciousness are not as prone to the negative effects of pressure 
because they are accustomed to performing under high self-awareness. Baumeister 
found that participants high in self-consciousness outperformed those low in self- 
consciousness. Lewis and Linder (1997) found evidence supporting Baumeister's 
prediction. However, a recent study by Bawden, Maynard, Graydon, and Chell 
(2000) found that anxious and highly self-conscious participants performed 
significantly worse than non-anxious and low self-conscious participants on a golf- 
putting task. An explanation for the discrepant findings described above may lie in 
the measure of self-consciousness used by the researchers. All the studies described 
above used a score composed of private and public aspects of self-consciousness. As 
Baumeister pointed out, "increased self-awareness of one's performance process 
seems to denote a private self-consciousness .. ." (p. 
611). It might be that the 
construct of private self-consciousness is more relevant in terms of conscious 
processing than public self-consciousness. Hence, in this respect at least, the 
composite measure of self-awareness adopted by Baumeister, Lewis and Linder, and 
Bawden et al. may have been inappropriate. 
25 
Within sport and "mainstream" psychology, the ideas described above have 
typically been placed within a traditional, cognitive framework that emphasises 
centralised executive control mechanisms situated at the highest level of a 
hierarchical structure. Such notions are clearly at odds with ecological accounts of 
motor control and learning that emphasise a more distributed framework (Davids, 
Handford, & Williams, 1994). Adopting a hybrid model of human functioning, 
Annett (1991), suggested that automaticity could be better conceptualised in terms of 
levels of control. Annett's proposals place human functioning within a heterarchical 
control structure. Such systems comprise higher-order strategic control mechanisms 
and lower-order operators. Annett suggested that the higher-order mechanisms direct 
the lower level mechanisms without conscious awareness of the operations 
performed at lower levels. Hardy, Jones and Gould (1996) put this simply, stating 
that "Elite performers may first `weigh up' the alternatives that are available in any 
given situation and then set conscious goals about what needs to be done. However, 
having done this, they trust their motor system `to get on with the job', and simply 
monitor progress to ensure that no major adjustments to the `game plan' are 
necessary. " (pp. 179-180). Although evidence for heterarchical models of motor 
control is scarce (Rumelhart & Norman, 1982), such models may be important in the 
context of conscious processing in terms of understanding exactly how 
multidimensional state anxiety affects performance. 
The heterarchical model of human functioning described above can be used to 
highlight a possible extension of Masters' (1992a) ideas on conscious processing. 
Specifically, Masters hypothesised that the effects of the cognitive and somatic 
subcomponents of multidimensional state anxiety on the processing system were 
inseparable, claiming that they were "so intertwined that one will directly influence 
the other" (p. 13; cf. Borkovec, 1976). Such a position ignores important evidence 
indicating that the cognitive and somatic subcomponents of competitive state anxiety 
follow different time courses (Martens, Burton et al., 1990) and exert differential 
effects upon certain aspects of performance (Parfitt & Hardy, 1993; Parfitt & Pates, 
1999). Heterarchical control systems allow for these differential effects. For 
example, increased somatic anxiety or physiological arousal may result in increased 
muscle tension that affects the operation of the lower level mechanisms, while 
cognitive anxiety may lead the performer to use the higher-level cognitive 
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mechanisms in an attempt to consciously control lower level automatic operations 
(Hardy, Jones & Gould, 1996). In terms of conscious processing, then, the 
suggestion is that the cognitive subcomponent of state anxiety may play the crucial 
role in impairing performance. 
In summary, the conscious processing hypothesis predicts that the normal 
automatic functioning of skilled but anxious performers is disrupted by increases in 
cognitive state anxiety, resulting in performance impairment. Corroborating 
evidence is scarce, however, and there is a need for further research in laboratory 
and applied settings. The applied implications of the conscious processing 
hypothesis are discussed later. 
Summary 
This chapter has attempted to clarify some of the problems relating to terminology 
within the area of stress and anxiety in the sport psychology literature. The chapter 
also outlined several theories with the potential to explain how anxiety affects 
performance. These theories included Easterbrook's (1959) cue utilisation 
hypothesis, cognitive interference theory (Sarason, 1972; Wine, 1971), Humphreys 
and Revelle's (1984) information processing model, processing efficiency theory 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), and Wegner's (1989; 1994) theory of ironic processes of 
mental control. The advantages and disadvantages of these approaches were briefly 
addressed before turning to examine Masters' (1992b) conscious processing 
hypothesis in more detail. Each of the theories examined has its own merits, and 
each probably warrants further investigation as it is possible that anxiety exerts its 
effect upon performance via more than one mechanism. In this respect both the 
conscious processing hypothesis and processing efficiency theory seem worthy of 
further empirical investigation. 
Purpose of the Research Programme 
The primary purpose of the present research programme was to examine the 
conscious processing hypothesis as a possible explanation for the effect of state 
anxiety upon motor performance. Specifically, the project attempts to replicate and 
extend the work of Masters (1992b), and then gradually moves toward an 
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interdisciplinary examination of some of the ideas generated by conscious 
processing effects and processing efficiency theory. 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is presented as a collection of research papers. Each paper incorporates a 
synopsis of the literature relevant to that paper. The final chapter (7) then provides a 
general summary. Thus, the structure of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 reports a study that replicates and extends Masters' (1992b) study, which 
examined the effect of high anxiety upon the performance of a golf putting task 
acquired using implicit and explicit learning strategies. 
Chapter 3 reports a study that adopted a quasi-experimental performance paradigm 
to examine the effect of task-relevant, explicit knowledge upon the performance of 
skilled trampolinists under high and low anxiety conditions. 
Chapter 4 describes a study designed to address alternative explanations of the 
findings from the studies outlined in chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, the study was 
designed to control for the desensitisation hypothesis identified in study 1, and 
Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory as a plausible alternative 
to the conscious processing hypothesis. An interdisciplinary focus was adopted 
incorporating behavioural and kinematic analyses of skilled golfers putting under 
low and high anxiety conditions while using task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
knowledge. 
Chapter 5 reports a study incorporating a refinement of the research design used in 
chapter 4 and continued the examination of the conscious processing hypothesis and 
processing efficiency theory. The study also extended the interdisciplinary approach 
adopted in chapter 4 using three-dimensional kinematic analysis to examine 
movements and spectral analysis of heart rate variability as a cardiovascular index of 
effort. 
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The study detailed in chapter 6 adopts a more applied focus by examining the effects 
of different types of explicit knowledge upon performance. Specifically, explicit 
knowledge is manipulated using holistic and part process goals. The effect of the 
two different types of process goals upon the performance of skilled golfers putting 
in low and high anxiety conditions was examined. 
The final chapter (7) summarises the research project as a whole. It also discusses 
the major theoretical issues addressed, explores the applied implications, identifies, 
the programme's strengths and limitations, as well as directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Knowledge and conscious control of motor actions under stress' 
(Study 1) 
Abstract 
Masters (1992b) investigated the effect of stress upon the performance of a well- 
learned golf putting skill, acquired under implicit and explicit learning conditions. 
Masters found that high anxiety had a detrimental effect on the performance of the 
explicit learning group but not the implicit learning group. However, the implicit 
learning group performed a random letter generation task during 400 learning trials 
but not during a high anxiety transfer test. It is possible that the participants in the 
implicit learning group continued to improve during the stress session simply 
because they were performing an easier task. The present study re-examines 
Masters' conclusions by replicating and extending his method. An additional 
implicit learning group was included which was required to carry out random letter 
generation during the learning trials and the high anxiety transfer test. It was 
hypothesised that this "new" implicit learning group would suffer the same 
disruption to performance as the explicit learning group, providing evidence 
contradicting Masters' explanation. Thirty-two subjects were allocated to one of 
four groups. Performance measures were analysed using mixed two-factor analysis 
of variance (4 x 5: Groups x Sessions). The main dependent variable was the 
number of putts successfully completed. The analysis revealed that both the implicit 
learning groups continued to improve their performance under stress whilst the 
explicit learning group did not. Despite limitations to both Masters and the present 
study, these results add support to Masters' conscious processing hypothesis. 
'Based upon Hardy, L., Mullen, R., and Jones, G. (1996). Knowledge and conscious control of motor 
actions under stress. British Journal of Psychology, 87,621-636. 
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Introduction 
Recent studies of the anxiety-performance relationship have relied upon 
explanations of the anxiety response which are based upon resource allocation 
models of information processing (Jones, 1990). In such models, performance 
decrements are thought to be due to performers using up attentional resources by 
worrying (Eysenck, 1982; Sarason, 1972; Wine, 1971). Carver and Scheier (1981) 
suggested a similar, distraction-based theory involving negative self-awareness. 
Carver and Scheier hypothesised that by becoming more aware of oneself while 
performing, attention would be taken away from task-relevant cues, causing 
performance degradation. Baumeister (1984) offered an alternative explanation, 
claiming that in competitive situations performers are highly motivated to do well 
and this leads to a tendency to focus on the process of performing. Thus, performers 
who realise the importance of precise skill execution will attempt to ensure success 
by consciously monitoring their performance. This may disrupt the natural 
automatic processing of information, which should be taking place if the performer 
is not a novice. This suggestion is supported by research conducted by Keele (1973), 
who found that performers who focused attention on piano playing skills suffered 
from performance decrements; and Langer and Imber (1979), who showed that 
attempting to ensure accuracy by consciously monitoring finger movements during 
typing was also detrimental to performance. This evidence is also consistent with 
Fitts, Bahrick, Noble and Briggs' earlier (1961) progression-regression hypothesis 
which suggested that learning produces a progression to complex control strategies 
and that exposure to stress produces a regression to more simple levels. 
The basis for Baumeister's explanation of the effects of competitive pressure 
upon performance may lie within theories of skill acquisition (cf. Anderson, 1982; 
Logan, 1988; Schmidt, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). One of the most 
fundamental ideas which characterises such theories is the suggestion that in 
acquiring a skill, a performer passes through several distinct developmental stages 
(Fitts & Posner, 1967). Two characteristics that can be used to distinguish between 
such phases are the type of knowledge (Anderson, 1982) or control (Schneider 
& 
Shiffrin, 1977) that guide performance. During the early stages of learning 
performance tends to be overtly processed and is also, typically, slow, effortful, and 
unrefined. The type of knowledge that guides performance during these early stages 
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is characterised as being "explicit" in nature (i. e., knowledge that is rule-based, 
available to consciousness and verbalisable: Reber, 1993). Subsequent practice 
results in a shift away from such overt processing to a stage where performance is 
fast, smooth, efficient, and subject to covert processing. Performance is now 
commonly characterised as being automatic in nature and the knowledge 
underpinning it could be described as being "implicit" (i. e., knowledge that is 
abstract, unavailable to consciousness and non-verbalisable; Reber, 1993). While 
implicit knowledge may be acquired without an initial base of explicit knowledge 
(Reber, 1993; Seger, 1994), expert performance can unquestionably be described as 
being automatic or implicit in nature. Indeed, this point is made by Reber (1993), 
who notes that the automatic processes described by contemporary learning theories 
are "classic examples of implicit systems" (p. 16). 
Bearing these remarks in mind, one possible explanation for the performance 
decrements reported by Baumeister (1984) may be that performers, in attempting to 
consciously monitor their performance, are "reinvesting" in their explicit knowledge 
base. As a result, performance regresses to a conscious level associated with early 
stages of learning. There seems to be little empirical evidence that directly supports 
this phenomenon. However, Masters (1992b) found that the execution of a well- 
learned golf putting skill acquired using typical "explicit" procedures, reliant upon 
the provision of rules or guidelines to direct performance, was impaired when 
performers were anxious. Masters hypothesised that this was due to performers 
attempting to control action using task-relevant explicit knowledge. Participants who 
acquired the same skill implicitly, that is, without recourse to explicit instruction, 
suffered no performance degradation during a stress test. In fact, anxious performers 
actually improved their performance. Masters interpreted his results as providing 
empirical support for the conscious processing hypothesis. 
The implicit learning condition was a key feature of Masters' (1992b) study. 
Implicit learning has been demonstrated using several paradigms. These include the 
acquisition of artificial grammars, sequence learning and the control of complex 
systems (for reviews see Berry & Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993; Seger, 1994). 
Empirical evidence also exists to support the notion of implicit learning in the 
context of motor learning (Green & Flowers, 1991). One of the central features of 
implicitly acquired knowledge that may be of interest to coaches and performers of 
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sports skills is the relative robustness of such knowledge "in the face of disorders 
and dysfunctions that compromise explicit knowledge" (Reber, 1993, p. 88). It may 
be that implicitly learned skills demonstrate greater resilience and stability under 
stress when compared to skills acquired explicitly. Reber cited an unpublished paper 
by Rathus, Reber and Kushner, who found evidence supporting this suggestion. 
Rathus et al. divided college undergraduates into two groups, depending on whether 
or not they scored above or below the median on Sarason's (1978) Test Anxiety 
Scale. High anxious participants took longer to explicitly memorise letter strings 
than low-anxious participants. Subsequently, on a test to determine whether 
participants had acquired any implicit knowledge about an underlying grammar 
structure in the letter strings, the performance of the two groups was statistically 
indistinguishable, suggesting that the negative effects of anxiety were experienced 
only on the earlier explicit task. Masters' results offered further support for this 
suggestion using a motor skill. 
One of the main reasons for questioning Masters' (1992b) interpretation of his 
results lies within current goal setting literature (Kingston & Hardy, 1994a; Orlick & 
Partington, 1988) which suggests that athletes should be encouraged to use process 
goals. Process goals commonly involve consciously attending to specific aspects of a 
movement in order to remain focused during performance. However, if Masters' 
conscious processing hypothesis is correct, the use of process goals by skilled but 
anxious performers might increase the likelihood of performance failure. 
There are more specific factors associated with Masters' (1992b) methodology 
that could possibly confound his interpretation. Masters tested the explicit 
knowledge hypothesis by having participants acquire a golf-putting task under 
explicit and implicit learning conditions. Explicit learning was promoted by asking 
participants to use technical information on the "correct" way to putt during the 
practice sessions. Participants in the implicit learning groups were not given any 
explicit instructions. Implicit learning was promoted by requiring participants to 
perform a random letter generation task throughout the duration of their practice 
sessions. The purpose of the random letter generation task was to interfere with the 
functioning of the central executive of the working memory system (Baddeley, 
1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Participants who putted while generating random 
letters were, therefore, denied the opportunity to self-generate explicit knowledge 
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about the task. Masters' study consisted of a learning phase of 400 trials, followed 
by a further 100 trials performed under high anxiety. Anxiety was elevated using a 
combination of social evaluation and financial incentive. The implicit learning group 
continued to improve during the high anxiety trial, while the explicit learning group 
did not. Masters interpreted these results as offering support for his conscious 
processing hypothesis. However, in the high anxiety condition, the implicit learning 
group was not asked to continue generating random letters. As such, the results 
could be attributed to a reduction in task difficulty. The aim of the present study was 
to address this task difficulty explanation by replicating and extending Masters' 
method. To address this problem an additional implicit learning group was included. 
Participants in this new group were required to continue to generate random letters 
during the stress condition as well as during the skill acquisition sessions. By 
generating random letters during the stress test, the "new" implicit learning group 
would be performing at a level of task difficulty equivalent to that experienced 
during the four skill acquisition sessions. It was hypothesised that the new implicit 
learning group would experience the same disruption to performance under stress as 
the explicit learning group. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two paid volunteers (16 male and 16 female, mean age = 21.13 years) were 
assigned to one of four conditions: implicit learning without random letter 
generation in the stress test (IL), implicit learning with random letter generation in 
the stress test (ILRLG), explicit learning (EL) and a non-stressed control group 
(NSC). Groups were assigned using stratified random sampling so that each group 
consisted of 4 male and 4 female participants. The participants, all right-handed, first 
year students at Cardiff Institute of Higher Education, had no experience of 
psychology courses. 
Apparatus 
The putting surface used in the present study was constructed according to criteria 
laid down by Masters (1992b). An identical "Astroturf" putting surface was used. 
Participants putted at a hole 10.8 cm in diameter, the size enforced by the United 
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States Professional Golf Association, from a distance of 150 cm. Task difficulty was 
increased by requiring participants to putt up a 25 per cent incline. All participants 
used standard size (4.27 cm in diameter) white golf balls and a standard sized golf 
putter (88.9 cm in length with a standard angle of lie and loft). Heart rate was 
measured using a Polar Electro Sport Tester PE300° heart rate monitor, comprising a 
transmitter, strapped around the participant's chest, and a receiver worn on the wrist. 
Participants' heart rates were recorded at 5 second intervals. An electronic 
metronome was used to emit "clicks" at regular intervals of 1.5 or 1.0 seconds in the 
RLG condition. 
Learning conditions 
Participants performed according to instructions that were tailored specifically to 
each group. 
Explicit learning (EL) group. Masters (1992a; 1992b) developed a set of specific 
instructions on how to putt a golf ball for use by the explicit learning group in his 
experiment. He compiled the instructions using two "reputable coaching sources" 
(Saunders & Clark, 1977; Stirling, 1985). The instructions used in the present study 
were identical to those used by Masters. These were presented to participants in the 
EL group in each of the first four sessions during the 5-minute resting phase prior to 
heart rate measurement. It was impressed upon participants that they should read the 
instructions carefully and follow them as closely as possible. The instructions were 
not presented during the final stress test. 
Implicit learning (IL) and implicit learning RLG (ILRLG) groups. In these 
conditions, participants received no instruction on how to putt, but were required to 
generate random letters while putting. To ensure replication, the task used mirrored 
that used by Masters (1992b), who had based his random letter generation on 
procedures outlined by Baddeley (1966). Participants were required to call out a 
random letter each time an electronic metronome "clicked". In the initial two 
sessions, clicks sounded every 1.5 seconds. In the two later sessions, clicks sounded 
every 1-second. The reduction in the time interval between clicks was designed to 
maintain the difficulty of the random letter generation, ensuring continued 
suppression of explicit knowledge throughout the learning phase. Participants were 
asked not to stop generating letters at any stage of the putting session and to give 
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priority to maintaining the randomness of the letters. Inter-click intervals of 1.0 - 1.5 
seconds were assumed to be too short to enable participants to divert their attention 
to the putting task. The 1L and ILRLG groups differed in that the IL group did not 
generate random letters during the high anxiety test phase whilst the ILRLG group 
were instructed to continue with the secondary task. Both groups were placed under 
stress in the final test phase. 
Non-stressed control (NSC) group. Participants in the NSC group received no 
instruction in the task of golf putting and were not required to generate random 
letters. The group was instructed to improve as much as possible. The control group 
remained unstressed in order to determine whether performance continued to 
improve in session 5 or had reached asymptote. 
Design 
The experiment had two distinct phases: a skill acquisition phase followed by a test 
phase. In the skill acquisition phase, consisting of four sessions of 100 putts, 
participants acquired the motor skill of golf putting implicitly, explicitly, or in a 
control condition. In the test phase, taking place over one session of 100 putts, 
participants in the EL, IL and ILRLG groups were subjected to stress while they 
performed, whereas those in the NSC condition were not. The five sessions took 
place on consecutive days at approximately the same time of day. 
Procedure 
All participants attended individually and were informed that the purpose of the 
experiment was to examine how well a skill could be acquired under different 
learning conditions. At the beginning of the sessions, participants were required to 
sit quietly for a period of 5 minutes to allow their heart rates to return to baseline. 
During the five minutes, all participants read a standard statement explaining that 
they would earn £12.00, and requesting that they not think about, rehearse or 
practise putting while away from the experiment. Immediately following the five- 
minute rest period, participants' heart rates were monitored for a period of three 
minutes. The first set of fifty putts began at the end of the three-minute period. In 
each session, participants made two sets of 50 putts separated by an interval of five 
minutes. A global performance measure, the number of successful putts made in 
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each session, was used as the primary dependent variable. No time constraints were 
imposed on participants. On completion of the task, it was impressed upon each 
participant that the study was ongoing, and that it was imperative that they did not 
discuss the experimental procedures with anyone. 
Stress measures 
Three stress indices were used to check the effectiveness of the stress intervention. 
Performance Anxiety. The Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; 
Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump & Smith, 1990) measured participants' performance 
anxiety. The CSAI-2 was administered pre- and post-stress intervention, to assess 
each participant's levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety. This was an extension of 
Masters' (1992b) study, which relied upon the state scale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) to provide only a 
unidimensional, non-situation specific measure of state anxiety. The use of the 
CSAI-2 is in line with recent sport-specific studies that have utilised this scale (for 
reviews see Jones, 1995; Jones & Hardy, 1990) and represents a response to the need 
for greater conceptual specificity. The CSAI-2 was used in the present study, as it 
offers more worthwhile information regarding the competitive anxiety response than 
the state scale of the STAI. The CSAI-2 is a sport-specific questionnaire that 
assesses the cognitive and somatic sub-components of state anxiety. A third sub- 
component, self-confidence is also measured by the CSAI-2, although this measure 
was not used in the present study. The scale comprises 27 items, with nine items in 
each of the three subscales of cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and self- 
confidence. Examples of cognitive anxiety items include "I am concerned about 
performing poorly" and "I am concerned about this competition", while somatic 
anxiety items include "I feel nervous" and "My body feels tense". Responses to each 
item are scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). The 
psychometric properties of the CSAI-2 have been well established. Internal 
consistency has been deemed to be adequate with Cronbach's alpha coefficients 
ranging from 0.70 to 0.90 (Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1987). Martens, Burton, 
et al. (1990) reported that concurrent validity had been confirmed by studies which 
had obtained the predicted relationships between the CSAI-2 and an assortment of 
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trait measures. The CSAI-2 was administered during the inter-trial interval in the 
third and fifth sessions. 
Heart Rate. Heart rate was monitored under stressed and unstressed conditions to 
obtain a direct physiological indication of stress, supporting the somatic sub- 
component of the CSAI-2. Heart rate was monitored at the beginning of each session 
for a period of three minutes. Before heart rate was measured, participants were 
required to sit quietly for five minutes to allow their heart rate to return to baseline. 
Task completion time. To ensure full replication, task completion time was recorded 
to examine Masters' suggestion that, under stress, the time taken to prepare for each 
putt would increase in order to ensure accuracy. The total time taken to complete the 
two sets of 50 putts was recorded each day in order to provide information regarding 
this expected slowing of performance in the stressed groups during the test phase. 
Stress intervention 
During the final test session the IL, ILRLG and EL groups were placed under stress. 
Following Masters (1992b), stress was induced by a combination of social 
evaluation and financial incentives. As in previous sessions, participants from the 
three stressed groups were asked to sit quietly for 5 minutes prior to heart rate 
measurement. However, during the middle 60 seconds of the 180 second heart rate 
monitoring period they were required to read a standard statement which explained 
that the original payment of £12.00 could increase to £15.00 or decrease to as little 
as £1.00, subject to evaluation of their putting performance by an "expert" in golf. 
As in Masters' (1992b) study, the suggestion that the sum of £12.00 could 
increase to £15.00 was introduced as a defensive measure against participants 
feeling that their performance was so poor it would be pointless to continue making 
an effort. It was thought that motivation would remain high if the participants 
believed there was a chance of winning their money back. Ten seconds after 
presentation of the statement the golf expert arrived and was introduced to the 
participant before retiring to an adjacent room where the participant's performance 
was to be viewed using a one-way mirror. The expert's fictitious status as a golf 
professional was emphasised by reference to past achievements, which included 
competing in "The Open" at St. Andrews. "Kitting out" the expert in a lambswool 
sweater and golf slacks completed the effect. As heart rate was still being monitored, 
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it was possible to obtain an indication of the participant's physiological response to 
the prospect of evaluation, and to the threat of losing almost all of the £12.00. The 
response elicited was measured by comparing the initial 60 seconds of the 180- 
second monitoring period with the final 60 seconds. A significant increase in heart 
rate was accepted as indicating an increase in performance apprehension. The final 
session of 100 putts then began. 
No actual evaluation was made. The expert was free to leave once he had entered 
the viewing room. Evaluation apprehension was maintained throughout the test 
conditions using pre-recorded coughing, which occurred at intermittent intervals. All 
participants received a lump sum payment of £12.00. 
Verbal protocols 
Verbal protocols were used to assess the amount of explicit knowledge generated by 
each individual. These tested the prediction that individuals learning implicitly 
would accumulate less explicit knowledge than those learning using either explicit 
rules or discovery learning. After completing the final 50 putts of the fifth session all 
participants were asked to write down all the factors that they felt were important in 
making a successful putt. The participants were asked to use information that they 
had become aware of over the five putting sessions. As admitted by Masters, this 
was a "primitive" way of measuring explicit knowledge. However, the same 
procedures were used in order to fulfil the criteria of replication. Summing the 
number of explicit rules each participant wrote down scored the written protocols. 
An explicit rule was understood to be any rule drawn from the explicit written 
instructions received or specifically relating to the technical and mechanical aspects 
of holing a putt. Statements not referring to the technical and mechanical aspects of 
putting were excluded. "Investigator triangulation" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was 
used to check the credibility of the explicit rules elicited from the written protocols. 
This method involved the use of an additional researcher who was trained in 
qualitative analysis techniques. Both researchers analysed the protocols 
independently using the same criteria. Checking one list against the other then 
corroborated the explicit rules elicited. 
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Results 
The data were subjected to several different analyses. The verbal protocols were 
examined to establish whether the acquisition of explicit knowledge had been 
successfully suppressed by the secondary task. The effectiveness of the stress 
intervention was tested by analysing the cognitive and somatic anxiety components 
of the CSAI-2 scores, heart rate, and task completion times. Finally, the performance 
scores were analysed to ascertain the extent of learning over the four skill 
acquisition sessions and any performance changes during the final stress test. All 
measures were tested using analyses of variance (ANOVA) and a priori contrasts. 
Tests of simple main effects and Newman-Keuls tests followed up significant effects 
in ANOVA models. 
Verbal Protocols 
It was predicted that the EL and NSC groups together would have a significantly 
larger pool of explicit knowledge than the IL and ILRLG groups together (Table 1, 
below). One-way ANOVA showed a significant main effect for the four learning 
conditions, F (3,28) = 5.69, p<0.01. The above prediction was confirmed using an 
a priori contrast, t (28) = 3.34, p<0.01. However, it is perhaps worth noting two 
points. Firstly, the NSC group actually acquired more rules than any other group, 
despite having received no explicit instruction. Secondly, the ILRLG group scored 
higher than the IL group, despite having carried out the RLG throughout the entire 
experiment. 
Table 1. Mean (SD) number of explicit rules reported after final stress test. 
Group Explicit rules 
Implicit learning 2.75 (1.38) 
Implicit learning RLG 4.88 (2.10) 
Explicit learning 5.63 (1.51) 
Non-stressed control 6.37 (2.26) 
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Stress intervention 
The effectiveness of the stress intervention was analysed by testing four separate a 
priori contrasts. It was hypothesised that the three stressed groups would exhibit 
greater increases in anxiety than the unstressed control group on each of the stress 
indices. Analysis of the cognitive and somatic anxiety subcomponents of the CSAI-2 
(Table 2, below) and heart rates (Table 3, below) confirmed these predictions, t 
(21.8) = 2.2, p<0.05; t (14.2) = 2.12, p<0.05; and t (28) = 3.22, p<0.01, 
respectively. The contrast performed on the task completion times (Table 3, below), 
only approached significance, t (28) = 1.88, p=0.07. Pooled variance estimates of 
"t" were used for the heart rate and task completion time contrasts. Separate 
variance estimates were used for the cognitive and somatic anxiety contrasts, as 
Cochran's test for homogeneity of variance was significant in both cases. Taken 
together, these results suggest that the stress intervention was effective as the three 
stressed groups (EL, IL and ILRLG) experienced significant increases in 
performance anxiety pre- and post-stress intervention when compared to the 
unstressed group (NSC). 
Table 2. Mean (SD) cognitive and somatic anxiety scores pre- (Pre-SI) and post- 
stress intervention (Post-SI). 
Cognitive anxiety 
Group Pre-SI Post-SI 
Somatic anxiety 
Pre-SI Post-SI 
IL 17.63 ( 4.03) 18.75 (4.71) 
ILRLG 18.63 (6.61) 23.13 (6.08) 
EL 14.25 (3.28) 16.63 (5.18) 
NSC 16.38 (4.21) 16.88 (3.91) 
17.63 (6.65) 16.75 (8.41) 
18.75 (7.32) 22.00 (7.41) 
12.13 (2.85) 15.13 (6.08) 
15.87 (4.22) 14.25 (5.06) 
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Table 3. Mean (SD) heart rates (bpm) pre- (Pre-SI) and post-stress intervention 
(Post-SI) and task completion times in sessions 4 and 5. 
Heart rate 
Group Pre-SI Post-SI 
Task completion time 
Session 4 Session 5 
IL 68.77 (10.46) 74.31 (14.14) 
ILRLG 67.69 (11.37) 75.25 (13.46) 
EL 72.19 (7.07) 79.15 (10.00) 
NSC 70.95 (7.86) 68.59 (4.77) 
10.44 (2.60) 
09.74 (1.22) 
12.09 (2.10) 
12.43 (2.52) 
10.95 (2.74) 
10.89 (1.83) 
12.24 (2.75) 
12.18 (2.26) 
Performance scores 
As with Masters' (1992b) experiment it was not possible to match participants on 
the basis of skill level. As Masters explained, exposure to a pre-test would have 
meant that the implicit learning groups would have been given the opportunity to 
self-generate explicit knowledge. To ensure that the groups were indeed equivalent, 
a one-way analysis of variance was performed on the mean number of putts holed in 
the first five putts of session 1 by each group. As hypothesised by Masters, no 
differences were expected over such a small range of putts. No significant 
differences were found between the groups, F (3,28) = 0.37, p>0.05. 
Figure 1 (below) displays the mean number of successful putts for each of the 
four groups over the five sessions. Mixed two-factor analysis of variance (4 x 5, 
Groups x Sessions, with repeated measures on the sessions factor) revealed a 
significant interaction, F (12,112) = 2.22, p<0.05. The main effect for sessions was 
also significant, F (4,112) = 41.18, p<0.001. No main effect for group was evident 
(p > 0.70). Newman-Keuls tests on the significant interaction indicated that none of 
the groups differed significantly at test 1. The IL group scored significantly lower 
than both the EL and ILRLG groups at test 2. During test 3, the IL group scored 
significantly lower than only the EL group; and during test 4 both the IL and ILRLG 
groups scored significantly lower than the EL group. No significant differences were 
found between the groups at test 5. 
42 
(D 0 
L 
cl) 
O. 
0 
a) 
E 
co 
m 
2 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
-' -- Implicit 
-P- Implicit RLG 
-ý Explicit 
Non-stress 
12345 
Sessions 
Figure 1. Mean number of putts holed as a function of sessions (1-5). 
Newman-Keuls tests were also employed to examine differences for each group's 
performance over the five tests. Although these indicated that each group improved 
significantly at some point, they did not reveal significant improvements from test 
four to five for any of the groups. As shown in Figure 1 the IL, ILRLG and NSC 
groups improved considerably over these last two sessions. The failure of the 
Newman-Keuls test to detect any significant differences could have been due to the 
large number of cells involved in the analysis. Analyses of simple main effects were 
therefore conducted on each group's performance over the five tests. These analyses 
revealed significant differences for all groups across the five tests, F (4,112) = 
13.07, p<0.01; F (4,112) = 17.28, p<0.01; F (4,112) = 10.83, p<0.001; and F 
(4,112) = 6.66, p<0.01 for the IL, EL, ILRLG, and NSC groups respectively. 
Newman-Keuls tests revealed that the IL group improved significantly from test 1 to 
test 4, and also from test 4 to test 5. The EL group improved significantly only from 
test 1 to test 2. 
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The performance of the ILRLG group also improved significantly from test 1 to 
test 2, and from test 3 to test 4. This group also made further significant 
improvements from test 4 to 5. The NSC group showed a significant improvement 
from test 1 to test 3, and from test 3 to test 4. These results reveal that both the 
implicit learning groups continued to make significant improvements when 
subjected to stress, whereas the performance of the EL group, that had acquired 
explicit knowledge, was severely retarded by the stress intervention. 
Discussion 
The results of the present study add support to Masters' (1992b) explicit knowledge 
hypothesis. The results of the stress intervention, when taken together, indicate that 
performance anxiety was successfully induced in the three stressed groups. As with 
Masters' experiment, the verbal protocols indicated that the two implicit learning 
groups had acquired significantly smaller pools of explicit knowledge than the 
explicit and control groups. However, it is worth noting that the control group 
reported a larger mean number of explicit rules than the explicit learning group, who 
were actually supplied with explicit instructions. This leads to the suggestion that, in 
the absence of explicit instruction, performers are capable of generating their own 
explicit knowledge base that they may use to guide performance during the early 
stages of learning. 
The performance scores recorded during the present study were similar to those 
reported by Masters (1992b). Masters, however, reported significant differences 
between the groups at the end of the first session, whilst in the present study the 
performance of the groups remained evenly matched at that stage. This suggests that 
the groups in the present study were well matched on the basis of skill level for this 
golf putting task. The hypothesis that the "new" implicit learning group (ILRLG), 
who continued to generate random letters under stress, would suffer from the same 
disruption to performance as the explicit learning group was not supported by the 
results. The ILRLG group actually continued to improve their performance during 
the stress test, mirroring the performance of the IL group. However, the performance 
of the EL group was impaired in the stress condition. 
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Assuming that the results of both Masters' (1992) and the present study do 
support the conscious processing hypothesis, there are several theoretical 
implications to consider. In the first instance further validatory research is required 
to explain how the regression process occurs. Of particular interest here is Eysenck 
and Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory. Eysenck and Calvo's theory has 
two main premises concerning anxiety effects upon performance. The first of these 
concerns the effect of worry or self-concern upon the working memory system. 
According to Eysenck and Calvo, worry affects tasks that impose demands on the 
capacity of working memory, mainly via the central executive, and, to a lesser 
degree, the articulatory loop. Anxiety affects the performance of such tasks by pre- 
empting some of the resources available to the working memory system; the more 
difficult the task, the greater the demands made upon the resources of working 
memory. The second premise concerns a distinction made by Eysenck and Calvo 
between processing efficiency and performance effectiveness. Performance 
effectiveness is outcome related and refers to the quality of task performance, while 
processing efficiency refers to "the relationship between the effectiveness of 
performance and the effort or processing resources invested in performance" (p. 
132). This distinction is important as performance effectiveness and processing 
efficiency are affected differentially according to Eysenck and Calvo's model. 
Briefly, it is assumed that anxious individuals will make greater use of a control 
system which is thought to mediate the effects of anxiety on processing and 
performance (Hockey, 1986). According to Eysenck (1992), a major function of this 
control system in anxious performers is to exert more effort in order to maintain 
performance effectiveness at an "acceptable" level. As a result, anxiety is thought to 
affect processing efficiency more than performance effectiveness. The "Eysenckian" 
notion of anxious individuals expending more effort in an attempt to improve 
performance could dovetail nicely with the explicit knowledge hypothesis. 
According to processing efficiency theory, greater expenditure of effort is associated 
with the allocation of additional processing resources. It may be that in trying 
harder, anxious individuals transfer task control from lower order, automatic sub- 
systems to higher-order, controlled sub-systems. Eysenck suggests such a 
possibility, noting that: 
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While this quantitative shift in the use of processing resources may 
well be a common reaction to inadequate performance, it is 
improbable that it is the only reaction. In many cases, there will be a 
qualitative shift from the current (and relatively unsuccessful) 
processing strategy to a different processing strategy. (p. 143, 
emphasis added) 
This contention is supported by Borkovec and Inz (1990) who found that the 
induction of worry results in thought processes predominating over imagery-based 
processes, suggesting that worry is more likely to affect the explicitly-oriented 
articulatory loop than the more implicitly-oriented visuo-spatial sketch pad. As 
Eysenck admits, such a shift in processing emphasis may mean that worry has more 
extensive effects upon the working memory system than processing efficiency 
theory currently predicts. The present results seem to sit comfortably with such a 
suggestion. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of such links, it seems unlikely that in their present 
forms, either processing efficiency theory or the conscious processing hypothesis 
can fully explain the behaviour of anxious performers under stress. For example, 
Eysenck (1992) does not address the issue of motivation (apart from effort). In the 
context of performance failures or "catastrophes" (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991), it 
becomes unclear to what extent the results of the present study can be attributed to 
anxiety effects or to the relative importance of the situation. Motivation may be an 
important mediating variable here. 
Aside from Masters' (1992b) conscious processing hypothesis, there are also 
several alternative explanations for the performance of the stressed groups. It may be 
that both the implicit learning groups continued to improve under stress because in 
generating random letters during the previous 400 skill acquisition trials they had 
become desensitised to self-generated verbal distractions. Thus, when exposed to the 
stress condition, participants in these groups may have become immune to the 
effects of performance anxiety. This seems to be the most pressing limitation to both 
Masters' and the present study. Future studies should examine alternative ways of 
manipulating the use of explicit knowledge in order to explore this hypothesis. 
It could also be argued that the performance disruption suffered by the EL group 
during the stress test was caused by a ceiling effect. In Masters' (1992b) study the 
performance of the control group improved beyond that of the explicit learning 
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group during the final session. However, in the present study the performance of the 
NSC group remained below that of the EL group. It could therefore be argued that 
the EL group had simply "hit" a performance ceiling. However, the author would 
prefer to argue against such an interpretation on the following grounds. The mean 
accuracy of the EL group during the final stress test was 39 per cent. This is 
considerably below the mean accuracy percentage achieved by Masters' non- 
stressed control group during their final session. Although Masters did not report the 
exact figure, examination of his graph reporting the mean number of putts holed 
reveals that this group approached 60 per cent during the final session. Indeed the 
performance of the EL group in the present study remained below the 42 per cent 
mean accuracy figure for all groups in Masters' study at the corresponding stage. As 
such, it seems unlikely that the results can be attributed to a performance ceiling. 
Applied implications 
The results of the present study have several practical ramifications. One of the main 
reasons, stated earlier, for questioning Masters' (1992b) interpretation of his results 
was the reported use of process goals by high level performers to keep them focused 
during performance. Support for the use of process oriented goals has been 
established by Orlick and Partington (1988); Kingston, Hardy and Markland (1992) 
and Kingston and Hardy (1994a; 1994b), with the latter studies by Kingston and 
associates endorsing the use of process goals over and above performance-related 
goals. As Masters' interpretation was supported by the present results, it does appear 
that the use of process goals by skilled but anxious performers can be called into 
question. One way around this apparent contradiction may be to encourage the use 
of pre-performance routines (Boutcher & Zinsser, 1990) which incorporate holistic 
process goals that focus on global aspects of a skill, thus encouraging chunking and 
automaticity (Kingston & Hardy, 1994b). 
Despite the success of the random letter generation task in suppressing explicit 
knowledge in the two implicit learning groups, it remains to be seen how this 
suppression can be transferred to the coaching environment, enabling performers to 
acquire skills implicitly. The instructions used by performers in the EL group were 
also successful in encouraging these subjects to rely upon explicit knowledge to 
guide their performance. However, the ecological validity of these instructions could 
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be called into question. Typically, coaches would administer such instructions one at 
a time. Coaches would also rely upon a far greater variety of coaching strategies, for 
example, demonstrations and augmented feedback, rather than just the written 
instructions provided in Masters' (1992b) and the present study. While discussing 
the ecological validity of the study, it seems appropriate to examine the method used 
to induce stress. The use of monetary incentives and social evaluation appear to be 
reasonable approximations of those experienced by performers. However, the 
provision of financial incentives can be questioned as Eysenck (1985) suggests that 
such incentives can act as a way of actually increasing motivation without 
generating an anxiety response. It may be that equivalent or greater levels of anxiety 
could have been achieved by relying upon social evaluation as the sole method of 
inducing anxiety in the three stressed groups (cf. Calvo, 1985; Calvo et al., 1990). 
The results also suggest that coaching strategies that follow the accepted 
procedures of early reliance upon explicit knowledge to develop motor skills can be 
called into question. Tuition of this type could, potentially, lead to skill breaking 
down under conditions of high stress. Indeed, much of the current research 
examining optimal practice situations addresses problems such as varying the form 
and timing of different types of explicit information (Berry & Dienes, 1993). This 
suggests a need to examine the potential of implicitly oriented learning strategies in 
coaching and teaching environments. 
The interaction of both explicit and implicit learning strategies in the context of 
motor skill acquisition also requires empirical analysis. It appears that different 
processes may underpin performance at different stages of learning and a variety of 
coaching and teaching strategies may be required to produce optimal results (Annett, 
1991). Similarly, the role of explicit and implicit learning strategies probably varies 
as a function of task demands. One can imagine, for example, that explicit 
instruction probably plays a much more central role in strategic sports such as rock 
climbing, with implicit strategies possibly predominating in sports such as tennis. 
A final practical implication concerns the use of modelling (Bandura, 1971) and 
imagery (Murphy & Jowdy, 1992) by performers. These techniques may enable 
performers to make better use of implicit rather than explicit knowledge. It may be 
that modelling and imagery techniques could enable learners to produce holistic 
conceptual representations of movements thus encouraging automatic functioning 
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and accelerating the learning process. In a similar manner, holistic imagery 
techniques could help elite athletes avoid the debilitating effects of anxiety. 
Summary and conclusions 
The preceding discussion has posed several questions and opened up a number of 
potential avenues of investigation that future researchers may wish to explore. The 
most pressing of these concerns is Masters' (1992b) conscious processing hypothesis 
explanation of anxiety effects upon performance. The role of implicit knowledge in 
motor skill acquisition also warrants further examination, especially as this study 
supports Masters' contention that such knowledge demonstrates robustness under 
conditions of high anxiety. 
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Chapter 3 
Effect of Task-Relevant Cues and State Anxiety on Motor Performance' 
(Study 2) 
Abstract 
Twelve experienced, female trampolinists participated in a field study designed to 
test Masters' conscious processing hypothesis which predicts that the combination of 
task-relevant knowledge and high levels of state anxiety will impair motor 
performance. Participants performed their voluntary competition routines while 
shadowing task-relevant cues in training and pre-competition sessions. State anxiety 
increased from training to pre-competition sessions. Two-factor analysis of variance 
(2 x 2, Anxiety x Shadowing, with repeated measures on both factors) indicated that 
performance in the high anxiety shadowing condition was impaired, supporting the 
conscious processing hypothesis. However, an alternative attentional explanation of 
the data was identified. 
' Currently accepted for publication as Hardy, L., Mullen, R., and Martin, N., Effect of task-relevant 
cues and state anxiety upon motor performance. Perceptual and Motor Skills. The data 
for this 
chapter was collected by Nikki Martin as part of an undergraduate research project at the University 
of Wales, Bangor. The study is included in this thesis more for the sake of completeness than 
originality. 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
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Chapter 4 
State anxiety and motor performance: 
Testing the conscious processing hypothesis' 
(Study 3) 
Abstract 
Previous research has argued that skills acquired explicitly are more likely to fail 
under stress than skills that have been learned implicitly. The present study 
addresses an alternative explanation for the robustness under stress of implicit task 
performance. As implicit learners acquired the skill of golf putting while generating 
random letters, it is possible that they had become desensitised to self-generated 
verbalisations and thus immune to the effects of competitive anxiety. The present 
study tested the conscious processing hypothesis, while controlling for 
desensitisation and a further rival attentional threshold hypothesis. The study also 
examined the effect of increased state anxiety upon the kinematic processes 
underlying performance breakdowns. For task performance, evidence was found that 
partially supported the conscious processing hypothesis, while the results of the 
kinematic analysis of the putting stroke were equivocal. Analysis of self-reported 
effort scores supported the predictions of processing efficiency theory. 
' In press as Mullen, R. and Hardy, L., State anxiety and motor performance: Testing the conscious 
processing hypothesis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 18. 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
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Chapter 5 
Conscious processing and motor performance: An interdisciplinary 
examination 
(Study 4) 
Abstract 
The conscious processing hypothesis has recently emerged in the sport psychology 
literature as a viable explanation for the effect of anxiety upon motor performance. 
The study reported here aimed to examine the conscious processing hypothesis, 
while controlling for an alternative attentional explanation of anxiety effects. 
Twenty-four skilled, male golfers completed 10 putts in control, task-relevant 
shadowing, and task-irrelevant tone counting conditions, while stressed and 
unstressed. Two-factor ANOVA revealed that performance deteriorated in the high 
anxiety shadowing and tone counting conditions. Kinematic analysis of clubhead 
and joint dynamics produced evidence supportive of a refreezing of degrees of 
freedom of the left wrist. Spectral analysis of heart rate variability indicated that 
performance impairment was associated with an increase in the power of the high 
frequency component of the heart rate power spectrum. 
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Introduction 
Despite recent advances in explanations of the anxiety-performance relationship 
(Hardy, 1996b; Jones & Hanton, 1996), existing models and theories fail to 
satisfactorily address how anxiety affects performance. Two plausible explanations 
have emerged with the potential to explain anxiety-induced performance 
impairment, Masters' (1992b) conscious processing hypothesis and Eysenck and 
Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory. 
Masters' (1992b) conscious processing hypothesis predicts that increased state 
anxiety leads performers to focus attention inwards in an attempt to control motor 
skills using task-relevant, explicit knowledge. Baumeister (1984) had previously 
found that highly motivated performers in competitive situations had a tendency to 
focus on the process of performing. By consciously monitoring their performance in 
an attempt to ensure success, highly skilled performers are likely to interfere with 
normal automatic task processing and adopt inappropriate control strategies. As a 
result, performance suffers. More recent evidence has supported the notion of 
conscious control (Lewis & Linder, 1997). 
Masters based his (1992b) conceptualisation of this phenomenon upon stages of 
learning (Fitts & Posner, 1967). Masters hypothesised that under stress, the smooth, 
unconscious, covertly controlled processes of the expert become destabilised as 
performers attempt to gain conscious control over actions and, in so doing, adopt a 
mode of control based upon explicit, or declarative, knowledge which is associated 
with early stages of learning. Masters and Hardy, Mullen and Jones (1996, Chapter 2 
of this thesis) examined the conscious processing hypothesis using a learning 
paradigm, in which participants acquired the skill of golf putting over 400 trials 
using either an explicit or an implicit learning strategy. In a subsequent transfer test, 
in which state anxiety was elevated, participants who had learned using an explicit 
strategy suffered performance impairment, while those using an implicit strategy 
continued to improve. Hardy, Mullen et al. identified an alternative interpretation for 
their own and Masters' results. Participants who learnt implicitly did so while 
generating random letters to prevent the generation of explicit knowledge about the 
task. Over 400 trials, these participants may have become desensitised to self- 
generated verbal distractions and at least partially immune to the effects of state 
anxiety. Hardy, Mullen, and Martin (under review, Chapter 3 of this thesis) set out 
to test the conscious processing hypothesis using a design that was not confounded 
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by desensitisation effects. Hardy et al. used a performance paradigm in which 
anxious trampolinists performed their voluntary competition routines while 
shadowing task-relevant cues. Hardy et al. found support for the conscious 
processing hypothesis. In a further study, Mullen and Hardy (in press, Chapter 4 of 
this thesis) successfully controlled for the desensitisation hypothesis using the 
performance paradigm adopted by Hardy et al. Skilled golfers putted while using 
explicit instructions on how to putt in order to encourage lapses into conscious 
processing. In a separate condition, the golfers putted while simultaneously 
performing a random letter generation task (Baddeley, 1966). The function of the 
random letter generation task was to interfere with the operation of the central 
executive of the working memory system (Baddeley, 1986), preventing participants 
accessing their explicit knowledge base. 
The performance paradigm and the random letter generation task also allowed 
Mullen and Hardy (in press) to examine a further possible explanation for the 
conscious processing effects identified by Hardy et al. (under review). If high levels 
of state anxiety and task-relevant cues combine to cause performance decrements 
then it is possible that performance impairment could be attributed to attentional 
overload, as predicted by Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory. 
Put simply, task-relevant cues may take up a "chunk" of attentional space, while 
anxiety-related worry takes up another "chunk". Individually, these do not affect 
performance, however, together they operate additively and deplete the resources 
available to maintain task performance. Mullen and Hardy found partial, although 
not unequivocal, support for conscious processing effects. 
Another key aspect of both conscious processing and processing efficiency 
perspectives is the amount of effort invested by performers. From a conscious 
processing perspective, increased effort should be related to the intensity of 
attentional processing as task control is transferred away from automatic processes 
to more effortful, attention-demanding, higher-order processes. In processing 
efficiency terms, anxious individuals attempt to compensate for performance 
decrements produced by task-irrelevant processing caused by worry by increasing 
attentional resources. In doing so, anxious performers may be able to maintain task 
performance, but at a greater cost to the processing system compared to the 
processing costs incurred in low anxiety conditions. Increases in on-task effort can 
be used to explain how anxious performers sometimes maintain "performance 
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effectiveness" at the expense of "processing efficiency" (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). 
As Eysenck and Calvo note, the weakness of many studies is their propensity to 
measure only performance effectiveness. Previous research has supported the 
suggestion that participants increase their effort as a function of increased anxiety 
(Calvo, Alamo, & Ramos, 1990; Calvo & Ramos, 1989). Such evidence adds weight 
to Eysenck's concern that a research focus on performance effectiveness does not 
accurately reflect the effects of anxiety upon task performance. 
Mullen and Hardy (in press) used a self-reported effort measure to examine the 
patterning of effort associated with conscious processing. Although their 
performance results partially supported Masters' conscious processing hypothesis, 
the patterning of effort scores produced by participants supported Eysenck and 
Calvo's (1992) compensatory effort hypothesis, as individuals increased their effort 
expenditure as a function of elevated levels of state anxiety. By their own admission, 
the single item, self-reported measure of effort used by Mullen and Hardy was rather 
"crude" in nature. More sophisticated measures of effort are available and have long 
been a feature of psychophysiology. However, as Abernethy, Summers and Ford 
(1998) note, "the methods used to develop this knowledge base have, 
disappointingly, had only limited impact on research within sport and exercise 
psychology" (p. 185). Sport-related studies have adopted some psychophysiological 
measures, for example, heart rate (Boutcher & Zinsser, 1990; Crews, 1989); 
electroencephalography (Landers et al., 1994) and electromyography (Kontinnen, 
Lyytinen, & Viitasalo, 1998). One psychophysiological measure that has been 
largely ignored in the sport-related attention literature is heart rate variability (HRV 
Mulder & Mulder, 1981). In sports science, HRV has frequently been used in 
physiological studies examining cardiac and autonomic responses to exercise 
(Warren, Jaffe, Wraa, & Stebbins, 1997). HRV has also been a prominent feature of 
human factors research, with studies focusing upon the central regulation of 
autonomic state, fundamental links between physiological and psychological 
processes and the evaluation of cognitive development and clinical risk (Berntson et 
al., 1997). Other researchers have suggested that HRV can be used as an index of 
mental effort (Althaus, Mulder, Van Roon, & Minderaa, 1998; Mulder, 1992). 
Laboratory and field studies have shown that HRV, as indexed by spectral analysis 
of the cardiac signal, can reflect changes in mental effort. Such changes are thought 
to reflect an increase in the use of controlled processing for task performance 
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(Aasman, Mulder, & Lambertus, 1987; Tattersall & Hockey, 1995; Vicente, 
Thornton, & Moray, 1987). 
HRV scores can be obtained using a range of methods, ranging from time 
domain statistics, such as the standard deviation of a series of inter-beat intervals, to 
spectral analysis of the heart rate signal. The advantage of using spectral analysis is 
that it provides the researcher with an insight into the sources of variance 
influencing HRV. Spectral decomposition of the heart rate signal produces periodic 
components of HRV aggregated within three main frequency bands (Mulder, 1985). 
The three frequency bands are associated with different functional influences in the 
modulation of heart rate: 
1. A low frequency band (0.02 - 0.06 Hz), believed to reflect thermoregulatory 
control and adaptation to task demands, although as Grossman (1992) notes, the 
mechanisms underlying oscillations in this frequency remain unclear. 
2. A mid-frequency band (0.07 - 0.14 Hz), sensitive to cognitive loading 
associated with controlled processing. According to some researchers (e. g. 
Mulder, 1988), the mid-frequency band is related to short-term regulation of 
blood pressure. The mechanisms behind this modulation of blood pressure are 
the subject of some debate (Berntson et al., 1997). While some researchers 
believe that fluctuations in this frequency are the result of sympathetic traffic to 
the sino-atrial node, others think that mid-frequency rhythms may reflect the 
effects of both branches of the autonomic nervous system (Grossman, 1992). 
Still others believe that the relative balance between sympathetic and vagal 
control can be indexed by looking at the relative balance between the mid- and 
high-frequency bands (Malliani, Pagani, & Lombardi, 1994). 
3. A high-frequency band (0.15 - 0.50 Hz), which is probably the most well 
established measure of a discrete set of neural mechanisms (Grossman, 1992). 
Fluctuations at these frequencies are related to momentary respiratory influences 
or respiratory sinus-arrythmia. Respiratory sinus arrythmia is thought to be 
predominantly mediated by respiratory gating of vagal efferent activity to the 
heart (Grossman, 1992). The dominant parasympathetic influence at these 
frequencies is mainly a function of the slower dynamics of the sympathetic 
system that are manifested at lower frequencies (Berntson et al., 1997). 
The mid-frequency band has consistently responded to changes from rest to task and 
to a range of between task manipulations (Mulder & Mulder, 1987). It appears that 
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mid-frequency responses are less sensitive to changes in difficulty levels within the 
same type of task. However, Jorna (1992) notes that major changes in task structure, 
which induce changes in the mode of operation, as in the shift from automatic to 
controlled processing, will induce sizeable HRV effects. Such effects are in line with 
the changes predicted by the conscious processing hypothesis. A number of 
laboratory and field based studies have examined HRV in the mid-frequency band 
under "stressful" conditions (see Mulder & Mulder, 1987, for a review). 
Unfortunately, none of these have involved sport-related motor skills or stress 
interventions similar to those experienced by sports performers. 
Reductions in the HRVMF band associated with controlled processing appear to 
dovetail nicely with the predictions of the conscious processing hypothesis. 
However, the patterning of autonomic activity associated with compensatory effort 
from a processing efficiency perspective is less clear. According to Mulder (1992), 
compensatory effort invoked to cope with changes in task demands is not reflected 
in reductions in spectral power in the HRVMF band. External stressors, such as 
fatigue and noise, appear to induce quite different physiological states, reflected by 
increases in spectral power in both the low and mid-frequency bands. Spectral 
analysis could help distinguish between conscious processing and processing 
efficiency explanations of the anxiety-performance relationship by identifying 
cardiovascular markers of the patterning of effort associated with high levels of state 
anxiety. 
Mullen and Hardy (in press) also examined the kinematic processes underlying 
conscious processing effects. Using two-dimensional analysis of working point 
(clubhead) and joint behaviour, Mullen and Hardy failed to find any firm kinematic 
evidence to support the conscious processing effects found for the performance data. 
The kinematic variables selected by Mullen and Hardy were exploratory in nature 
and based upon suggestions made in the motor learning (Delay, Nougier, Orliaguet, 
& Coello, 1997) and control (Handford, Davids, Bennett, & Button, 1997) literature. 
The present study focused more closely on predictions generated by the conscious 
processing hypothesis. Specifically, Masters (1992a) suggested that the shift from 
automatic to controlled task processing should result in changes to the physical 
characteristics accompanying performance. Automatic task performance is fast, 
smooth and relatively effortless, while performances governed by controlled 
processes are slower, erratic and effortful (Schneider, Dumais, & Shiffrin, 1984). 
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Temporal analyses were supplemented by an examination of the time to the initial 
acceleration peak of the clubhead following initiation of the downswing in order to 
index the smoothness of the movement at working point level (Handford et al., 
1997; Schneider, Zernicke, Schmidt, & Hart, 1989). Mullen and Hardy also used 
cross correlations to assess the fluency of the left and right wrist joints. Sidaway, 
Heise and Schoenfelder-Zohdi (1995) have criticised the use of correlation 
coefficients to measure motor behaviour that might be non-linear and recommended 
the use of angle-angle diagrams to assess inter- and intra-limb coordination. 
However, Beuter, Duda, and Widule (1989) used angle-angle diagrams and failed to 
identify coordination changes associated with increased physiological arousal in a 
stepping task. The use of phase plane portraits, in which joint angular velocities 
were plotted against their angular displacements, proved more effective. Beuter et al. 
found that the distal (ankle) joint was more susceptible to disruption than proximal 
(knee and hip) joints. Accordingly, phase plane portraits were preferred to angle- 
angle diagrams in the present study. Phase plane portraits of the left and right wrist 
joints were used to examine the smoothness of the putting stroke in the distal (wrist) 
joint. Analysis of the range of motion of the wrist joints was also included. From an 
ecological psychology perspective, anxious individuals may attempt to regain 
control of motor actions by re-freezing degrees of freedom in distal joints (Handford 
et al., 1997). Although not entirely consistent with notions of regression from a 
cognitive perspective, such ideas may be relevant in the context of conscious 
processing effects. It was hypothesised that in attempting to regain conscious control 
of the putting stroke, anxious performers would "re-freeze" degrees of freedom in 
the distal (wrist) joint. As Mullen and Hardy noted, this may appear counterintuitive 
to notions of increased "wrist break" usually associated with the "yips", but is more 
in line with current evidence on motor learning strategies. 
The main aim of the present study was to further examine conscious processing 
and processing efficiency explanations of the anxiety-performance relationship. It 
was predicted that the anxiety intervention would significantly increase both 
cognitive and somatic state anxiety, in line with multidimensional anxiety theory 
(Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990). In terms of performance, the conscious 
processing hypothesis predicts that the largest performance decrements occur when 
cognitively anxious participants use task-relevant cues. Processing efficiency theory, 
on the other hand, predicts that performance impairment will occur when cognitively 
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anxious participants putt using task-relevant or task-irrelevant cues. Spectral analysis 
of heart rate variability and a self-report measure were used to examine the 
energetical patterning of effort. In vivo three-dimensional kinematic analyses of joint 
and clubhead behaviour provided an insight into the processes underpinning 
performance. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four right dominant, right-handed male golfers volunteered to take part in 
the study. All of the participants used a traditional putting technique incorporating 
either an overlapping or interlocking grip. Putting ability was examined by 
conducting a median split on absolute error putting performance in the low anxiety 
control condition in the present study. An independent t test confirmed that the 
putting ability of the two groups was significantly different, t (17.36)' = 0.23, p<. 05. 
Putting ability was included as an independent variable in subsequent analyses. 
Mean age for the "better" putters (n = 12) was 29.92 (SD = 3.32) and for the 
"poorer" putters (n = 12), 23.5 (SD = 0.93). For the better putters mean handicap 
was 15.75 (SD = 1.23) and mean number of years playing experience was 8.17 (SD 
= 1.50). For the poorer putters mean handicap was 15.67 (SD = 1.10) and mean 
number of years playing experience was 5.08 (SD = 0.78). All participants gave 
informed consent before beginning the study. 
Apparatus 
Participants putted up and across a 12.5% incline at a hole (diameter = 108 mm) 3m 
away, using their own personal putter. Heart rate data were collected using Ag/AgCl 
electrodes that were attached to three sites on the subjects chest: the sternum, lower 
left rib cage (V5/V6) and the lower right rib cage. Interbeat intervals were 
determined using a dedicated R-peak trigger which detected the QRS complex in the 
electrocardiogram with an accuracy of 2 ms. The data recorder fitted into a belt 
worn around the participant's waist and did not interfere with the putting stroke. 
Putting trials were recorded using a two-camera optoelectric imaging system 
(MacReflex, Qualisys, Partille, Sweden) operating at 120Hz with a shutter speed of 
0.25 ms. Passive retro-reflective markers were placed on the right and left shoulder, 
' Corrected for unequal variances. 
92 
elbow, and wrist, at the top of the club shaft and on the clubhead. During the tone 
counting condition, described below, a BBC microcomputer generated high and low 
pitched tones at random, with a frequency of 1 Hz. 
Measures 
Competitive state anxiety. State anxiety was assessed using the Competitive State 
Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990). 
The CSAI-2 is a sport-specific, self-report inventory that has been demonstrated to 
be a reliable and valid measure of cognitive and somatic anxiety and self-confidence 
with alpha reliability coefficients ranging from . 79 to . 90 (Martens, Burton, et al., 
1990). The directions at the start of the CSAI-2 were slightly modified to account for 
the fact that the one of the anxiety conditions was a putting competition and the 
other was a neutral putting task. Heart rate was also used as a measure of 
physiological arousal in conjunction with somatic anxiety. As Hardy (1996b) has 
noted, physiological arousal can influence performance directly, for example by 
inducing tonic changes in muscular tension that may affect fine motor coordination, 
or indirectly though performers' perceptions of their physiological state as indexed 
by the somatic anxiety component of the CSAI-2. 
Performance. Polar coordinates, allowing independent measures of "strength" and 
direction, assessed the accuracy of the putts. The polar coordinates are expressed as 
the distance of the ball from the start of the putt (r), and the angle of deviation (0) 
from a line drawn from the start of the putt to the centre of the hole. Successful putts 
were therefore scored: r=3,0 = 0. 
Heart rate variability. Spectral analysis of the cardiac interval signal was performed 
with the CARSPAN spectral analysis programme (Mulder, Van Roon, & Schweizer, 
1995). Spectral measures are expressed in relative terms (Mulder, 1992), equivalent 
to the squared coefficients of variation for the measurement period (squared 
modulation index, SMI). Measures used in the main analysis were HR (bpm) and 
mean HRV in the mid-frequency band (HRVMF, 0.07-0.14 Hz) and the high- 
frequency band (HRVHF band, 0.15-0.40 Hz). Analysis of the low frequency (LF) 
band was not considered valid because of its high vulnerability to non-stationarity 
effects (Mulder, 1988). Measurement epochs of 5 minutes or less are also too brief 
to obtain a reliable estimate of power in the LF band. Changes in HR and HRV from 
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baseline to task were computed for each condition and used as dependent variables 
in subsequent analyses. 
Self-reported effort. A retrospective, self-report measure was used to examine effort 
(Mullen & Hardy, in press). Participants rated their perception of effort invested in 
the task via the following question: "Based upon the most amount of effort you have 
ever put into a golf putt, how would you rate your effort during the last ten putts? 0 
= no effort, 10 = the most effort" (Crews, D., personal communication to L. Hardy, 
1993). 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check took the form of a social validation 
questionnaire created specifically for this study. Four questions with a 
dichotomous response scale were included. The first two questions asked whether 
participants felt that they had performed as requested during the shadowing and 
tone counting conditions. The third question determined whether participants used 
the tone counting task as a rhythm to aid their putting and the fourth question 
asked whether, overall, performers felt they had performed as asked. Finally, an 
open-ended question asked participants to briefly describe what they were 
thinking about during the control condition. The questions established adherence 
to treatment instructions. 
Experimental conditions 
Each participant performed in all conditions as detailed below: 
Task-relevant condition (TR). Participants putted while shadowing task-relevant 
coaching points to encourage lapses into conscious processing. Participants were 
asked to select three personal coaching points from a list compiled from a coaching 
manual (Cochran & Stobbs, 1968). Participants were allowed to generate their own 
coaching points if they felt that none of the available points were suitable. The 
performers paraphrased the coaching points into verbal cues that the experimenter 
repeated aloud during the final stages of each participant's pre-performance routine 
between the set up and initiation of the backswing. It was emphasised to participants 
that they should concentrate on using the coaching points to guide their performance 
on each putt. 
Tone-counting condition (TC). Participants were asked to putt while listening to 
randomly generated high and low pitched tones. Participants were instructed to give 
priority to the tones and to count the number of high pitch tones emitted during each 
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putt (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990). This task replaced the random letter generation 
used by Mullen and Hardy (in press), as continuous verbalisation would have had a 
confounding effect upon heart rate variability (Jorna, 1992; Mulder, 1992). 
Control condition. Participants were required to putt as they would normally putt. 
Design 
Participants were tested on two separate days, once with a neutral instructional set 
and once with an evaluative instructional set. Administration of the instructional sets 
was counterbalanced. The evaluative instructions informed participants that they had 
the opportunity to take part in an indoor putting competition, with prizes of £40, 
£20, £10, and £5 available. Competitors were to be judged on their putting 
performance, measured in terms of the lowest absolute error scores, and an 
evaluation of their putting strokes compared to the strokes of single handicap 
players. They were informed that the evaluation was to be conducted by a golf 
professional. It was emphasised that they would have to try very hard if they were to 
perform well in comparison with the other players. A league table of final results 
was also to be circulated to all participants at the end of the study. The neutral 
instructions informed participants that their individual data would not be compared 
to anyone else's, and that their scores were to be combined with other players of a 
similar standard in order to expand the experimenter's database for future work. 
Participants were required to complete the putting task in the control, tone counting 
and shadowing conditions. Thus, each participant completed three sets of trials on 
each day. Participants were randomly assigned to treatment orders and the order of 
the first and last conditions was reversed during the second set of trials. 
Procedure 
Participants attended individually and were informed that the researcher was 
interested in the effects of a variety of different conditions on putting performance. 
On arrival, performers were fitted with the ECG electrodes and the R peak trigger, 
and then asked to take a seat and relax for 5 minutes. This ensured that heart rate 
values stabilised prior to the collection of baseline data. A five-minute baseline data 
collection period followed, during which participants remained seated. Following 
baseline data collection, participants read the appropriate instructional set and 
completed the CSAI-2. Participants began putting as soon as the CSAI-2 had been 
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completed. Each participant completed 20 warm up putts before beginning the 
experimental procedures, which consisted of 10 putts in each of the conditions 
outlined above. Each putt was marked to allow measurement of polar coordinates 
following the session. After completing a block of 10 putts, participants completed 
the self-reported effort measure and then rested for three minutes in order to allow 
heart rate effects to dissipate before beginning the next trial. Completion of the post- 
experimental manipulation check followed the final block of 10 putts. The questions 
were used to exclude participants who experienced major problems adhering to the 
instructions. Following the final session, participants were thanked and debriefed 
about the true objectives of the experiment. 
Data Reduction 
Heart rate variability. Possible artefacts were identified by calculating the mean 
interbeat interval (IBI) value and its standard deviation in a 40-second time window. 
The window was shifted throughout the data set and an artefact was detected if the 
current IBI value was more than 3 standard deviations away from the current 
shifting mean. For each participant, the total artefact time was always less than 5% 
of total registration time during any session. The procedures described by Mulder 
(1992) were used to correct artefacts. Normal distribution of all HR and HRV data 
was achieved using natural logarithmic transformations. 
Kinematics. Joint angles were defined as follows: elbow angle - the angle created by 
the shoulder, elbow, and wrist markers; and wrist angle - the angle created by the 
elbow, wrist, and top of club shaft markers. Preliminary analysis of the data 
suggested that the optimal sampling frequency was 60 Hz. Filtering was performed 
by initially estimating optimal cut-off frequencies for displacement, velocity and 
acceleration using power spectrum assessment. A recursive second-order low-pass 
Butterworth filter was used to filter the data, and first-order finite differences were 
used to calculate higher-order derivatives (Giakas & Baltzopoulos, 1997; Giakas, 
Baltzopoulos, & Bartlett, 1998). 
The primary dependent variables were logically divided into distinct subsets that 
assessed different aspects of the putting stroke. For working point dynamics, 
backswing and downswing times assessed task completion times. Time to the initial 
acceleration peak of the clubhead following initiation of the downswing indexed the 
smoothness of the stroke. Analysis of joint dynamics comprised examination of 
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phase plane portraits for the left and right wrist and the range of motion of both 
wrists throughout the entire putt. Due to the large volume of data, phase plane 
portraits and joint range of motion analyses were restricted to 8 participants. 
Results 
Putting ability was originally included as an independent variable in our analyses. 
However, preliminary examination revealed that for all anxiety, performance, 
cardiac, and self-reported effort dependent variables, no significant effects for 
putting ability were present. As a result, all analyses reported treated the participants 
as a single group of 24 participants aged between 19 and 62 (M = 36.33, SD = 
16.33), with handicaps ranging from 10 to 21 (M = 14, SD = 4.4). Mean playing 
experience for the group was 6.3 years (SD = 8.56). 
One-tailed, paired t-tests for the CSAI-2 components determined the 
effectiveness of the anxiety manipulation. Performance scores were analysed using a 
priori contrasts that tested two interactions, one specifically predicted by the 
conscious processing hypothesis and the other by processing efficiency theory. The 
conscious processing contrast tested whether the difference between the tone 
counting and shadowing conditions changed as a function of anxiety. The 
processing efficiency contrast tested whether the difference between the control 
condition and the average of the tone counting and shadowing conditions taken 
together changed as a function of anxiety. 
Self-reported effort, HR, HRVMF, and HRVHF scores were also examined 
using a set of a priori contrasts. The first of these tested whether the dependent 
variables increased as a function of anxiety across the three putting conditions, as 
predicted by processing efficiency theory. The two a priori contrasts used to test the 
performance scores, one for the conscious processing hypothesis and one for 
processing efficiency theory, were also employed to examine whether the anxiety 
and putting conditions produced any interaction effects for the effort variables. 
It could be argued that the analysis of the data outlined above should proceed 
using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) as it may be considered relevant 
to examine the linear combination of, for example, the polar coordinates, as both 
relate to performance. However, as hypotheses about the patterns of effects to be 
obtained across the dependent variables were specific, univariate tests were 
considered more appropriate. Additionally, the specific nature of the hypotheses 
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meant that the normal increase in Type 1 error rate associated with multiple tests 
was no longer applicable (Stevens, 1996). Consequently, no reduction in alpha level 
was deemed necessary and alpha was maintained at . 05 for the anxiety, 
performance, cardiac, and self-reported effort tests. 
Kinematic variables were examined using two-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA; Anxiety x Putting Condition, with repeated measures on both factors). 
Alpha for the kinematic variables was adjusted using Bonferroni corrections 
according to the subsets identified earlier. For clubhead backswing and downswing 
times, and joint range of motion for the left and right wrist, alpha was adjusted to 
. 025. 
For the single index of smoothness of the stroke, time to initial peak 
acceleration, alpha was maintained at . 05. Effect sizes for contrast analyses and 
ANOVA were computed using omega squared (w2) for fixed effect models (Vaughn 
& Corballis, 1969). Omega-squared was preferred to the eta-squared statistic used in 
previous studies as it is a less biased estimate of the magnitude of experimental 
effect (Howell, 1997). As Howell notes, although cot is also biased, it is a much 
more effective inferential statistic than eta-squared, which is largely descriptive. 
Manipulation check 
Twenty-three participants indicated that they focused upon the coaching points in 
the low and high anxiety shadowing conditions. In the tone counting condition, 21 
participants confirmed that they concentrated on counting the tones in the low 
anxiety condition. This number decreased to 20 in the high anxiety condition. 
Minor problems were also indicated, as 7 participants indicated that they used the 
tones as a rhythm to aid their putting in the low anxiety condition. This number 
decreased to 6 in the high anxiety condition. Overall, 100% of participants indicated 
that they believed they had carried out the instructions as requested. However, 
responses to the previous questions suggested that this was not the case. McNemar 
tests indicated that none of the responses to the manipulation check changed 
significantly from low to high anxiety conditions. The mean number of tones 
counted correctly increased from 84.58% (SD = 15.31) in the low anxiety condition 
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to 86.25% (SD = 18.37) in the high anxiety condition. Wilcoxon's signed ranks test 
indicated that this change was not significant (Z = -. 286, p> . 05). 
Given the problems identified with adherence to the shadowing and tone 
counting tasks, all data were analysed with and without the problem participants. 
Removal of the problem participants did not affect the results obtained from the full 
data set. As a result, data from all participants is reported here. 
State anxiety 
As predicted, the anxiety manipulation significantly increased cognitive anxiety 
levels (low anxiety mean = 15.22, SD = 4.38; high anxiety mean = 17.21, SD = 4.27; 
t (23) = 3.12, p< . 01). Neither somatic anxiety (low anxiety mean = 13, SD = 3.57; 
high anxiety mean = 14.22, SD = 4.73; t (23) = -1.63, p> . 05) nor self-confidence 
(low anxiety mean = 25.96, SD = 1.22; high anxiety mean = 24.74, SD = 4.77; t (23) 
= . 95, p> . 
05) differed across anxiety conditions. 
Performance 
For directional bias, neither the conscious processing nor processing efficiency 
contrast was significant, F (1,23) = . 
841, p> . 
05,0 = . 006, and 
F (1,23) = 3.07, p 
> . 
05, w2 = 0.08; p> . 05, respectively. For length of putt, the conscious processing 
contrast was also not significant, F (1,23) = . 04, p> . 05, w2 = 0.004. 
However, the 
processing efficiency contrast did reach significance, F (1,23) = 6.1, p< . 05, w2 = 
. 21. 
Examination of Figure 1 (below) indicates that putts were significantly longer in 
the high anxiety tone counting and shadowing conditions. 
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Figure 1. Mean performance scores for length of putt. 
Cardiac variables and self-reported effort 
For self-reported effort, HRVMF and HRVHF, the main effect for anxiety 
conditions was not significant, F (1,23) = 1.89, p> . 05, w2 = . 02; 
F (1,23) = . 03, p 
> . 05,0 = . 
00; F (1,23) = 3.07, p> . 05,0 = . 08, respectively. The main effect 
for 
HR for anxiety condition approached significance, F (1,23) = 3.72, p= . 06, w2 = 
. 
09. For self-reported effort, HR and HRVMF, neither the conscious processing, F 
(1,23)=. 180, p>. 05, & =. 002; F(1,23)=2.17, p>. 05, w 2=. 04; F(1,23)=. 03, 
p> . 05, w2 = . 
00, respectively; nor processing efficiency contrasts were significant, 
F(1,23)=. 62, p>. 05, w2=. 018; F(1,23)=. 00, p>. 05, w2=. 00; F(1,23) = 1.18, 
p >. 05, c02 =. 05, respectively. 
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Table 1. Mean (SD) self-reported effort, HR, and HRVMF scores. 
Variable Anxiety Control 
Putting Condition 
Tone counting Shadowing 
SRE* High 7.79(l. 32) 7.00(l. 61) 8.17(l. 37) 
Low 7.75 (1.23) 6.58 (1.91) 7.92 (1.25) 
HR High 3.01 (0.35) 2.92 (0.28) 3.01 (0.29) 
Low 2.87 (0.32) 2.75 (0.33) 2.91 (0.25) 
HRVMF* High 7055 (1987) 6985 (1479) 7332 (1743) 
Low 7153 (1829) 6882 (1355) 7286 (1901) 
Note. SRE = Self-reported effort; HR = heart rate, HRVMF = heart rate variability 
mid-frequency band, *= Values reported are untransformed units for ease of 
interpretation. (N. B. values for cardiac variables are differences from baseline). 
Similarly, for HRVHF, the conscious processing contrast failed to reach 
significance, F (1,23) = . 52, p> . 05, w2 = . 002. However, the contrast examining 
the processing efficiency prediction did reveal a significant effect, F (1,23) = 4.93, 
p <. 05, w2 =. 18. Examination of figure 2 (below) reveals that in both low and high 
anxiety control conditions and the high anxiety shadowing and tone counting 
conditions, differences in power in the HRVHF band remained close to baseline 
levels. In the low anxiety shadowing and tone counting conditions, however, the 
HRVHF response was considerably elevated from baseline. 
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Figure 2. Mean HRVHF difference scores (N. B. Scores are original values prior to 
logarithmic transformation for ease of interpretation; SMI = squared modulation 
index). 
Kinematic variables 
Means (SD) for clubhead and joint kinematic variables are presented in Table 2 
(below). ANOVA for clubhead backswing and downswing times revealed no 
significant main effects for anxiety condition or putting condition, F (1,23) = 1.30, 
p> . 025, w2 = . 
002 and F (1,23) = . 22, p> . 025, w2 = . 002; and 
F (2,46) = 3.22, p> 
. 025, o= . 
02; F (2,46) = 2.86, p> . 025,0 = . 08, respectively. 
The Anxiety x 
Putting Condition interactions for clubhead backswing and downswing also failed to 
reach significance, F (2,46) = 1.21, p> . 
025, w2 = . 
001 and F (2,46) = 1.21, p> 
. 025, w2 = . 
001 for backswing time and downswing time, respectively. 
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Table 2. Mean (SD) scores for kinematic variables. 
Variable Anxiety Control 
BST High 0.61 (0.08) 
Low 0.59 (0.08) 
DST High 0.28 (0.03) 
Low 0.27 (0.04) 
TIPA High 0.72 (0.11) 
Low 0.70 (. 11) 
JROM (LW) High 5.96 (2.47) 
Low 7.50 (4.27) 
JROM (RW) High 6.15 (2.14) 
Low 6.48 (2.10) 
Putting Condition 
Tone counting Shadowing 
0.62 (0.07) 0.61 (0.08) 
0.62 (0.09) 0.61 (0.09) 
0.28 (0.03) 0.27 (0.03) 
0.28 (0.04) 0.27 (0.03) 
0.74 (0.12) 0.75 (0.11) 
0.73 (0.13) 0.73 (0.12) 
6.53 (3.52) 6.58 (4.42) 
7.70 (3.77) 7.32 (4.36) 
6.65 (2.22) 6.23 (2.54) 
7.17 (2.39) 6.29 (2.18) 
Note. BST = backswing time; DST= downswing time; TIPA = time to initial peak 
acceleration at start of downswing; JROM = joint range of motion; RW = right 
wrist; LW = left wrist. 
For the joint range of movement for the right wrist, the main effect for anxiety 
failed to reach the corrected significance level, F (1,7) = 4.48, p> . 025, w2 = . 
35. 
For joint range of movement for the left wrist, the main effect for anxiety was 
significant, F (1,7) = 9.65, p< . 
025, w2 = . 70. Examination of the cell means 
in 
Table 2 indicates that high levels of state anxiety resulted in a reduced range of 
motion in the left wrist. 
The phase plane portraits for the right wrist revealed no notable differences for 
any of the experimental conditions. The phase plane portraits for the left wrist joint 
(Figure 3, below) illustrate the dynamic relationships between angular displacement 
and angular velocity, and provide further insight into the spatiotemporal organisation 
of the joint complex under low and high anxiety conditions. 
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Figure 3. Typical phase plane portraits for the left wrist for the low anxiety (upper) 
and high anxiety (lower) conditions. S= start of putt; SDS = start of downswing; 
ABC = approximate ball contact. 
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The portraits show that that motion proceeds in an anti-clockwise direction with 
positive velocity to the right of the y-axis and negative velocity to the left of the y- 
axis. Six out of the eight participants showed consistent differences in the observed 
phase planes across anxiety conditions. Generally, the diagrams showed that the 
joint trajectories tended to compact themselves, graphically illustrating the reduced 
range of motion confirmed by the statistical analysis. The reduced range of motion 
resulted in several crossings or loops in the trajectory of the portraits. Additionally, 
maximum negative velocity tended to increase from low to high anxiety conditions, 
while maximum positive velocity remained approximately stable. 
Discussion 
The main aim of the present study was to examine the predictions of the conscious 
processing hypothesis and processing efficiency theory with regard to performance 
impairment of a motor skill. No firm support for the conscious processing 
hypothesis was found, although conscious processing effects could not be totally 
ruled out. The performance data may be best interpreted in terms of processing 
efficiency theory. Despite the performance effects, the patterning of the various 
effort indices and kinematic variables failed to provide any additional support for 
either conscious processing or processing efficiency perspectives. However, the 
kinematic analysis did produce support for the ecological notion that performers 
might react to increases in cognitive anxiety by re-freeezing degrees of freedom in 
distal joints. 
The success of the evaluative instructions in increasing cognitive state anxiety 
provides further support for their use in laboratory-based studies in competitive 
anxiety research (Hardy, Parfitt, and Pates, 1994; Mullen & Hardy, in press; 
Williams & Elliott, 1999). Despite concerns regarding the ecological validity of 
such instructions, and laboratory studies in general, in this study the instructional set 
accounted for 17% of the variance in cognitive state anxiety, a small to moderate 
effect. Despite this effect, however, in the high anxiety condition the levels of state 
anxiety reported by participants were still well below those reported by athletes 
in 
actual competitions. The self-confidence response of the participants is of note. 
Previous research has suggested that self-confidence may "protect" against the 
negative effects associated with high state anxiety (Hardy, 1996a), enabling 
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performers to continue their efforts successfully. The maintenance of high levels of 
self-confidence under stress may be a way for performers to enhance motivation and 
apply the extra effort that offsets performance deficits (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). As 
Carver and Scheier (1998) note, "If expectations of success are sufficiently positive, 
then the person returns efforts towards the goal" (p. 180). Hatzigeorgiadis and 
Biddle (1998) found evidence to support the notion that expectancy moderates the 
application of effort by anxious performers. Specifically, high expectancies might 
stimulate anxious performers to apply extra resources to the task at hand. However, 
when expectancies are low, such thoughts might discourage individuals, resulting in 
the withdrawal of effort. The lack of any significant effects for heart rate as an 
indicator of physiological arousal is probably not surprising as the instructional set 
was specifically designed to increase cognitive state anxiety. The somatic anxiety 
response of the participants, which also remained stable across anxiety conditions, 
provided additional, convergent evidence that the anxiety intervention produced no 
changes in physiological response. 
In terms of putting performance, the contrast analyses allowed a close 
examination of the predictions of processing efficiency theory and the conscious 
processing hypothesis. The results lend support to processing efficiency theory, as 
performance was impaired in the high anxiety tone counting and shadowing 
conditions. Two interpretations are possible. Firstly, the shadowing and tone 
counting tasks may have combined with the worry caused by high levels of 
cognitive state anxiety to reduce attentional resources (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; 
Graydon & Eysenck, 1989; Janelle et al., 1999). However, it is feasible that 
conscious processing may also have occurred, suggesting that performers might be 
susceptible to both conscious processing and distraction effects. The suggestion that 
anxiety may affect performance via more than a single mechanism is not new. For 
example, Eysenck (1988) identified four perceptual and memory effects associated 
with increased anxiety. It may be that skilled but anxious performers find their 
performance disrupted by reductions in attentional resources (processing efficiency 
theory) and attempts to volitionally control motor actions (conscious processing). 
From a processing efficiency perspective, the self-reported effort scores suggest 
that the participants were unable to allocate extra resources to the putting task under 
conditions of high anxiety. In the high anxiety control condition, resources seem to 
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have been adequate to cope with the extra demands imposed by high levels of 
cognitive anxiety. In the high anxiety tone counting and shadowing conditions, 
however, participants appear to have been unable to cope with the additional 
demands, were apparently unable to invest extra effort, and performance 
subsequently deteriorated. The use of a single-item self-report measure requires 
some consideration in interpreting the effort data. Self-report measures have been 
criticised in some quarters (e. g, Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, because of the 
difficulty in finding objective measures of effort, self-report indices remain 
important. As Vicente, Thornton and Moray (1987) note, "If a person feels loaded 
and effortful, he is loaded and effortful, whatever the behavioural and performance 
measures may show" (p. 175). 
Turning to the HRV data, we failed to find the hypothesised effects for the 
HRVMF spectral band. If the performance decrements suffered by participants in 
the high anxiety shadowing condition were indeed caused by conscious processing, 
then the analysis of the HRVMF band failed to produce evidence that shifts from 
automatic to controlled task processing might be indexed using this measure. It is 
possible that the hypothesised reductions in the HRVMF band may have been 
masked by the impact of physiological responses to increased cognitive anxiety. As 
spectral power in this band is thought to be reflective of both sympathetic and vagal 
activity, it is clear that further validatory work is required to examine the response of 
the HRVMF band to increases in state anxiety. 
The analysis of the HRVHF band produced results that partially reflect the 
pattern of the performance scores. It appears that the use of shadowing and tone 
counting tasks in the low anxiety produced an increase in spectral power in the 
HRVHF band, compared to control conditions. This may indicate an increase in 
vagal activity, a decrease in respiratory frequency, or a combination of both factors. 
This response may have been indicative of an active coping response initiated by the 
participants to deal with the increased demands imposed by the tone counting and 
shadowing tasks. In other words, when challenged by a dual task during putting, 
golfers respond by employing a breathing-based relaxation strategy, which decreases 
respiratory frequency and increases spectral power in the HRVHF band when they 
are not anxious. Under stress, this effect is countered by anxiety-induced 
sympathetic activity. Although in the high anxiety tone counting and shadowing 
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conditions, power in the HRVHF band recovers to levels similar to the control 
condition, this pattern of activity now appears to be indicative of a sub-optimal 
activation pattern. Any inferences regarding parasympathetic control should, 
however, be interpreted with caution, as "only under conditions in which the 
respiration pattern remains largely unchanged or is statistically adjusted for would 
respiratory sinus arrythmia index variations in cardiac vagal tone" (Althaus, Mulder, 
Mulder, Van Roon and Minderaa, 1998, p. 421). Respiration was not measured in 
the present study. However, there is evidence that differences in HRVHF power 
remain consistent before and after statistical adjustments for average respiration 
frequencies (Thayer, Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996). 
The kinematic analysis failed to produce unequivocal evidence in support of 
conscious processing or processing efficiency effects. We had originally 
hypothesised that the range of movement in the wrist joint would only be affected 
when anxious performers putted using task-relevant cues. In the language of 
ecological psychologists, an emotional variable like anxiety, and thought patterns 
such as those induced using task-relevant cues would be classed as forms of 
organismic constraint (Davids et al., 1997). It was predicted that anxiety and task- 
relevant knowledge would constrain the movement of individuals in the high anxiety 
shadowing condition. However, the significant decreases in joint range of motion 
found for the left wrist indicated that anxious performers may react to increases in 
cognitive anxiety by re-freezing degrees of freedom, limiting movement variability 
in a key joint, regardless of the type of knowledge used to guide performance. The 
data presented here represent the first real evidence of such a regression effect. Re- 
freezing degrees of freedom would probably be a preferred explanation of anxiety 
effects from an ecological perspective. It is presently unclear how the dynamical and 
cognitive perspectives can be integrated in order to explain more fully movement 
behaviour under stress. The data presented here indicate that dynamical accounts of 
behaviour require serious consideration by cognitive scientists engaged in anxiety 
research. 
The phase plane portraits provide supportive graphical evidence of the 
reductions in joint range of motion for the left wrist. The compression of the phase 
plane portraits in the high anxiety conditions is also suggestive of reductions in 
fluency in the left wrist. These are illustrated by self-crossings or loops in the 
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movement pattern, indicating changes in the direction and sign of the angular 
velocity, which might correspond to periods of hesitation (Beuter & Duda, 1985). 
Beuter and Duda found similar effects in the distal (ankle) joint of highly aroused 
children engaged in a stepping task, suggesting that "... distal joints may be more 
susceptible to higher order processing ... or changes in movement strategies" (p. 
240). Interestingly, despite the changes in joint dynamics described above, 
performance is maintained in the high anxiety control condition. Participants appear 
to compensate for the changes in joint dynamics, making their performance very 
robust to anxiety effects (cf. Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1983). The increases in time to 
initial peak acceleration for the tone counting and shadowing conditions were not 
predicted. It appears that the longer initial accelerations might indicate longer, 
smoother transitions from the backswing. However, this suggestion should be 
treated with caution, as ANOVA for backswing and downswing times produced 
main effects for putting condition that approached significance (p = . 05, 
&= 
. 09) 
indicating that the increased time to initial peak acceleration was probably a function 
of the longer swing times. 
A number of limitations were evident in the present study. As participants putted 
up and across a 12.5% incline, the slope across the putting surface confounded the 
polar coordinates to some extent. Weaker putts failed to make the top of the slope 
and rolled back down to the right of the hole. Looking at the cardiac variables, 
several factors require consideration. Vocalisation can influence the HRV power 
spectrum (Mulder, 1992) and was strictly controlled in the present study. Performers 
were specifically instructed not to speak at all during the putting sequences and 
responded using their fingers to indicate the number of tone counting probes. The 
metabolic demands of putting could also have introduced artefacts (Mulder, 1988). 
However, the demands of the putting stroke are unlikely to have unduly influenced 
the results as HRV data have been reliably collected in much more demanding 
situations, such as underwater diving (Jorna & Gaillard, 1988). Respiratory 
influences on the HRVHF spectral band also require attention and future research 
should consider measuring respiration during performance and statistically adjusting 
for its effect upon the cardiac cycle. Stationarity of the heart rate signal is a 
statistical assumption of time series analysis. Measurement epochs were kept as 
short as possible in order to avoid problems of this kind (Mulder, 1992). The method 
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of quantification of spectral power may also be problematical, a factor that plagues 
all HRV research (Berntson et al., 1997). In the present study, HRV data collection 
and analysis procedures were undertaken using hardware and software developed by 
the researchers whose theoretical predictions regarding "effort" we were specifically 
examining (Mulder, 1992; Mulder & Mulder, 1981; Mulder & Mulder, 1987). 
Applied Implications 
In terms of practical implications for coaches, performers and sport psychologists, 
several aspects of the data are notable. It appears that using a relevant or irrelevant 
secondary task can have a detrimental effect upon performance when cognitive 
anxiety levels are high. Several strategies may help performers deal with such 
distractions. Overlearning may help performers develop highly automated skills that 
are more robust in the face of anxiety as expert performers may be able to maintain 
performance effectiveness despite attentional depletion. The use of process goals by 
performers is called into question by the current data. Task-relevant knowledge that 
is fragmented in nature may actively degrade performance. In skilled performers, 
holistic process goals that focus upon the "whole" skill and encourage "chunking" 
may be of more use to performers, although this suggestion needs empirical 
clarification. The joint kinematics also indicated that holisitic process goals might be 
useful to encourage fluidity in key areas of movements that might otherwise be 
"frozen" as a result of increased anxiety. The use of HRV may also enable 
researchers to identify energetical influences on HR that play a part in performance 
impairment. The current data implicate a decrease in the level of vagal activity in 
anxious performers. Applied relaxation techniques may help performers promote 
vagal activity and maintain an appropriate activation pattern in the face of increased 
anxiety and distractors. Refinement of the techniques used in the present study may 
offer more clues as to the exact nature of the processes involved. 
Summary and conclusions 
To conclude, the performance data presented here offer little firm support for the 
conscious processing hypothesis and suggest that the observed deficits were more 
likely mediated by an overload of attentional capacity. Specifically, any form -of 
additional task, relevant or irrelevant, was detrimental to putting performance. It is 
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also possible that the performance decrements can be accounted for by a 
combination of the conscious processing hypothesis and processing efficiency 
theory. The performance data may indicate that performers are susceptible to 
distraction and conscious processing. Future research should adopt interventions that 
can clearly differentiate between conscious processing and distraction effects. The 
kinematic data produced evidence that supports the notion of regression from an 
ecological psychology perspective. The use of spectral analysis of HRV as a 
dependent variable has also provided researchers in sport psychology with an 
additional tool that may be fruitful in determining the energetical processes 
underlying the anxiety-performance relationship. 
111 
Chapter 6 
Conscious processing and the part process goal paradox 
(Study 5) 
Abstract 
The study reported here examined the hypothesis that part process goals lead to 
conscious processing and subsequent performance impairment when used by skilled, 
but anxious performers. Holistic process goals were predicted to encourage 
automatic functioning, thereby helping to maintain performance under stress. Forty 
skilled golfers were randomly assigned to part or holistic process goal groups. 
Twenty participants were excluded as they reported problems adhering to treatment 
instructions. Two-factor ANOVA revealed that both groups maintained performance 
under stress. Self-reported effort increased as a function of anxiety, appearing to 
help compensate for the increases in state anxiety. The results failed to support the 
predictions of the conscious processing hypothesis. 
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Introduction 
The conscious processing hypothesis has recently emerged in the sport psychology 
literature as a possible explanation for anxiety-induced performance decrements in 
sport (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996, Chapter 2 of this thesis; 
Masters, 1992b). Masters' conceptualisation of the conscious processing hypothesis 
is based upon stages of learning (Fitts & Posner, 1967). Masters hypothesised that 
the automatic control processes of the expert become destabilised under stress as 
performers attempt to gain conscious control over their actions to try to ensure task 
success. In so doing, performers are hypothesised to adopt a mode of control based 
upon explicit knowledge, associated with early stages of learning. 
Masters (1992b) and Hardy, Mullen, et al. (1996) asked novices to learn a golf 
putting task using an explicit or implicit learning strategy. In a high anxiety transfer 
test, the performance of the explicit learners was impaired, while implicit learners 
continued to improve. Masters concluded that the impaired performance of the 
explicit learners in his study was due to conscious processing. Hardy, Mullen et al. 
found similar results but offered an alternative interpretation for both their own and 
Masters' data. In Masters' and Hardy, Mullen et al. 's studies, participants who 
learned the putting task implicitly did so while generating random letters in order to 
prevent the build up of explicit, task-relevant knowledge. These participants 
performed the random letter generation over 400 learning trials and in so doing may 
have become desensitised to self-generated verbal distractions and at least partially 
immune to the effects of competitive state anxiety. 
Hardy, Mullen and Martin (under review, Chapter 3 of this thesis), using a 
design that tested the conscious processing hypothesis but avoided confounding by 
desensitisation effects, also found evidence that supported Masters' (1992b) 
hypothesis. Experienced trampolinists performed their voluntary competition 
routines using task-relevant cues in low and high anxiety conditions. Mullen and 
Hardy (in press, Chapter 4 of this thesis) successfully controlled for the 
desensitisation hypothesis in their examination of conscious processing effects. 
Following Hardy, et al. (under review), Mullen and Hardy adopted a performance 
paradigm, in which skilled participants were asked to perform under low and high 
anxiety conditions using task-relevant cues to encourage lapses into conscious 
processing. The participants, golfers, were also asked to perform while 
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simultaneously performing a random letter generation task (Baddeley, 1966). The 
random letter generation task prevented participants accessing their explicit 
knowledge base. The combination of the performance paradigm and the random 
letter generation task controlled for the problem of desensitisation associated with 
repeated use of random letter generation in the learning paradigm adopted by 
Masters and Hardy, Mullen, et al. (1996). 
Hardy et al. (under review) also noted that attentional overload, rather than 
conscious processing, may have caused the performance impairment associated with 
the combination of high anxiety and task-relevant knowledge. Mullen and Hardy (in 
press, Chapter 4 of this study) examined the hypothesised attentional effects using 
Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory as a theoretical 
framework. Mullen and Hardy found partial support for Masters' conscious 
processing hypothesis. In an attempt to clarify the influence of task-relevant 
knowledge upon the performance of anxious participants, Chapter 5 of this thesis 
partially replicated and extended Mullen and Hardy's research design. The study 
reported in Chapter 5 prouced evidence supporting a processing efficiency, rather 
than conscious processing interpretation of anxiety-related performance effects. 
However, conscious processing was not totally discounted as an explanation for the 
performance results in Chapter 5, as anxious participants may have been susceptible 
to both conscious processing and attentional effects. 
An alternative method of addressing the conscious processing hypothesis while 
controlling for attentional threshold explanations involves goal setting. Adopting a 
goal setting intervention would also allow the examination of an important issue that 
has been noted in the anxiety (Hardy, Jones, et al., 1996; Mullen & Hardy, in press) 
and goal setting (Kingston & Hardy, 1997) literature. Specifically, process goals 
present something of a paradox in terms of the conscious processing hypothesis. 
According to Kingston and Hardy (1994a) process goals "specify behaviour in 
which the performer will engage during performance, and can provide the performer 
with a primary focus which, if adhered to, can increase the likelihood of successful 
execution of the target behaviour" (p. 147). Process goals have been recommended 
by sport psychologists as a means of helping skilled performers deal with high 
anxiety by providing them with a means of focusing their attention on important 
aspects of performance (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996; Kingston & Hardy, 1997). 
However, by their very nature, process goals encourage performers to focus on 
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specific aspects of a task using explicit knowledge about that task. In combination 
with high levels of state anxiety, such cues should lead to conscious processing. 
A possible solution to the paradox outlined above involves distinguishing 
between different types of process goal. Holistic process goals may be of use in 
encouraging performers to conceptualise the whole of a movement. For example 
"smooth" or "tempo" may be used as holistic process goals for a golf putt. Such 
goals may function by encouraging "chunking", allowing the appropriate subactions 
to be generated automatically (Anderson, 1982). The concept of chunking has been 
used to describe the automatisation of cognitive skills, where individual elements of 
a task are gradually incorporated into single representations, allowing smoother 
performance (Neves & Anderson, 1981). MacMahon and Masters (1998) produced 
evidence for the chunking effect using a serial reaction time task. MacMahon and 
Masters also found that, under pressure, the process of chunking reversed and the 
skill effectively "de-chunked". Holistic process goals should not induce lapses into 
conscious processing because conscious control can only be exerted over parts of a 
movement. Part process goals, on the other hand, should induce conscious 
processing as a focus on a part of a movement by a skilled but anxious performer 
might encourage dechunking. 
The notion of holistic process goals or "swing thoughts" has been well 
documented anecdotally and empirically in the applied golf psychology literature. 
Owens and Kirschenbaum (1998) noted that some golfers use a mechanical thought 
to get through a swing confidently. They add, "the best mechanical thoughts are 
whole swing thoughts" (p. 23), and that partial swing thoughts or specific swing 
mechanics can create difficulties and interrupt the smooth flow of the stroke. Such 
advice is not new and Sarazen (1950) noted that players should avoid disrupting 
their concentration before a shot by wondering if "thirty-three anatomical parts" 
would perform their appointed functions. 
Importantly, such advice has some empirical foundation. Cohn (1991), 
investigating peak performance in golf, interviewed nineteen professional and North 
American collegiate golfers. Among other things, the golfers reported a narrow 
focus of attention involving either a single swing cue or thought or an external focus 
on the ball or "pin". Additionally, the golfers reported that automatic performance 
did not involve conscious thought. Backman and Molander (1991) showed that 
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explicit instructions impaired the golf putting performance of experts but not novice 
players, lending support to the notion that conscious processing effects disrupt the 
automatic control processes of skilled performers. Jackson and Wilson (1999) 
examined the effect of using a "swing thought" on the putting performance of 
anxious golfers. Results indicated that the use of a single task-relevant cue helped 
prevent performance impairment. Jackson and Wilson suggested that the use of the 
swing thought helped prevent performers from lapsing into conscious processing. 
Crucially, in a second experiment, Jackson and Wilson found that using four explicit 
rules related to the putting stroke did disrupt the performance of anxious 
participants. 
All the available evidence suggests that part process goals should induce lapses 
into conscious processing when highly skilled performers are cognitively anxious. In 
terms of addressing potential attentional overload explanations of conscious 
processing effects, holistic and part process goals can be thought of as using 
equivalent amounts of attentional space. We examined the performance of skilled 
golfers who putted using part and holistic process goals in high and low anxiety 
conditions. It was predicted that anxious golfers who putted using a part process goal 
would suffer performance impairment, while those who used an holistic goal would 
maintain "normal" automatic functioning and, as a result, performance effectiveness. 
Mullen and Hardy (in press) and study 4 of this thesis (Chapter 5) also examined the 
role of effort in anxiety-induced performance breakdowns. Controlled processing is 
more effortful than automatic processing (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Using self-report 
and autonomic indices, Mullen and Hardy and study 4 failed to find any increases in 
effort associated with shifts from automatic to controlled processing as a result of 
conscious processing. Instead, the available evidence suggests that individuals 
allocate extra effort as a function of increased anxiety, as predicted by processing 
efficiency theory. The present study included a self-reported effort measure to 
examine the response of anxious individuals using part and holistic process goals 
and we predicted that anxious participants would generally respond with higher 
levels of effort. We also predicted that the effort response in the part process goal 
group in the high anxiety condition would increase as the part process goals 
encouraged lapses into conscious processing. 
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Method 
Participants 
Forty male, right-handed, right-dominant golfers volunteered to take part in the 
study and provided informed consent before attending the putting laboratory. 
Intermediate golfers, with handicaps ranging from 10-20, were selected, as their 
movements would be sufficiently automated and susceptible to conscious processing 
effects. Novices would naturally be consciously controlling movements and more 
skilled performers may have strongly established performance routines that are 
relatively immune to anxiety interventions. Participants were randomly assigned to 
part and holistic process goal groups. The mean age of the participants in the part 
process goal group (n = 20) was 28.28 years (SD = 11.32), their mean handicap was 
15.36 (SD = 3.44) and their mean number of years playing experience was 8.83 (SD 
= 5.13). For the holistic process goal group (n = 20), mean age was 26.56 years (SD 
= 9.13), mean handicap was 15.16 (SD = 2.71) and mean playing experience was 
8.89 years (SD = 3.86). 
Apparatus 
Participants putted up a 12.5% incline at a hole (diameter = 108 mm) 2.8 m away 
using their own personal putter. The putting surface was Astroturf packed with 
"sharp" sand to produce a realistic putting surface. The coefficient of friction of the 
surface was 0.65. 
Measures 
Competitive state anxiety. State anxiety was assessed using the Competitive State 
Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990a). 
The CSAI-2 is a sport-specific, self-report inventory demonstrated to be a reliable 
and valid measure of cognitive and somatic anxiety and self-confidence, with 
Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranging from 0.70 to 0.90 (Gould, Petlichkoff, & 
Weinberg, 1987). The directions at the start of the CSAI-2 were slightly modified to 
account for the fact that the one of the anxiety conditions was a putting competition 
and the other was a neutral putting task. 
Effort. A retrospective, self-reported measure examined effort. Participants rated 
their perception of effort invested in the putting task via the following question: 
`Based upon the most amount of effort you have ever put into a golf putt, how 
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would you rate your effort during the last ten putts? 0= no effort, 10 = the most 
effort" (Crews, personal communication to L. Hardy, 1993). 
Performance. Absolute error, with zero recorded for successful putts, and the 
number of successfully holed putts served as performance outcome measures. Mean 
absolute error was calculated for each block of 10 putts. 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check took the form of a social validation 
questionnaire created specifically for this study. The check ascertained whether 
participants had adhered to their treatment instructions. Dichotomous-response 
questions asked whether participants found their chosen goal useful, whether they 
mentally pictured themselves using the goal, how difficult it was to concentrate on 
the goal, and whether the goal made it easy to concentrate on putting. Participants 
were also asked whether they used any strategy other than the chosen goal, and, if 
so, what sort of strategy. Finally, participants were asked if, overall, they thought 
that they had carried out the instructions as requested. 
Design 
The experimental design was based upon a paradigm successfully used by Jackson 
and Wilson (1999). Participants were tested in a single session. The design consisted 
of four phases: warm up, baseline, intervention and competition. The four phases 
were presented in a fixed order for all participants, ensuring that baseline data were 
collected prior to exposure to the anxiety intervention. The warm up phase consisted 
of 10 putts, followed by a further 10 putts in the baseline condition. Following the 
administration of the anxiety manipulation, participants performed 10 putts in the 
competitive, high anxiety condition. 
Procedure 
participants were provided with written information indicating that the purpose of 
the study was to examine the effects of goal setting on golf putting performance. 
participants were tested individually. On arrival, participants were informed that 
they would be required to complete a total of 30 putts in three blocks of 10, using a 
specific goal strategy, and that they would also asked to complete three 
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questionnaires during the session. Participants then generated the appropriate 
process goal. Participants in each process goal group were asked to think of a 
specific aspect of their putting technique that they would choose to focus on. 
Participants in the holistic process goal group were asked to think of a general, 
global goal that encapsulated the whole of their putting action. Participants in the 
part process goal group were asked to think of a specific subcomponent of the 
putting stroke that they could use as a swing thought. If participants were unable to 
generate their own goal, lists of part and holistic process goals specific to putting 
were provided from which participants in the respective groups could choose their 
own. Three sport psychologists accredited by the British Association of Sport and 
Exercise Sciences with knowledge of golf generated the lists of goals. Once the 
goals had been generated, participants were then given brief training on how to use 
their particular goal as part of a performance routine. Part of this training ensured 
that all participants paraphrased their goal into a short phrase. Participants were 
asked to focus hard on the goal and image the putting stroke using the goal they had 
generated during the set up phase of the putt. Participants were also asked to repeat 
the goal to themselves directly before they began the putt. Participants then 
completed ten warm up putts using the routine. Following the warm up, the CSAI-2 
was administered. Participants then completed ten putts in the baseline condition and 
completed the self-reported effort scale. Following this the anxiety intervention was 
administered. Participants were informed that the final block of putts formed part of 
a competition and shown the scores of five other "competitors". The scores were 
actually yoked to each participant's own baseline score so that this score was always 
below third place but no worse than equal fourth or fifth of the five scores posted. 
participants were informed that they had the opportunity to win a prize of £20, £10, 
£5 or £2.50 for beating the first, second, third or fourth placed score during the final 
block of putts. The CSAI-2 was administered immediately following the 
competition instructions and participants then completed the final round of ten putts. 
The final self-reported effort scale was then administered and the manipulation 
check completed. Before leaving the laboratory, the researcher thanked the 
participants and debriefed them about the true objectives of the study. 
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Results 
CSAI-2 subcomponents, performance and self-reported effort dependent variables 
were examined using mixed two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA; Goal Group x 
Anxiety Condition, with repeated measures on the second factor). Effect sizes were 
computed using omega squared (w2) for fixed effect models (Vaughn & Corballis, 
1969). 
Manipulation check 
Crucially, 10 participants in each group reported having difficulty keeping their 
thoughts on the same goal and using an alternative strategy. These participants were 
removed from the analysis. Subsequent analyses were conducted upon 20 
participants. In the part process goal group (n = 10), the mean age of the participants 
was 31 years (SD = 12.59), their mean handicap was 16.90 (SD = 4.25) and their 
mean number of years playing experience was 7.90 (SD = 4.91). For the holistic 
process goal group (n = 10), mean age was 28.20 years (SD = 11.12), mean handicap 
was 14.18 (SD = 2.44) and mean playing experience was 9.60 years (SD = 5.82). 
Further responses to the social validation questionnaire indicated that for the 
large part, participants in both process goal groups found the goal they had selected 
useful and successfully imaged the goal before putting (part process goal group = 
10; holistic process goal group = 9). Nine participants in each group reported that 
they found the goal that they had selected useful in helping their concentration. In 
the part process goal group a variety of part process goals were adopted, including 
"blade square" (n = 3), "wrists firm" (n = 3), "short back" (n = 3), and "head still" (n 
= 1). In the holistic process goal group "smooth" (n = 6) proved to be the most 
popular goal. Two other goals were used, "fluent" (n = 3), and "move (the hands, 
arms and shoulders) as (a) unit" (n = 1). There were, however, some further 
difficulties reported. In the part process goal group, one performer used an 
alternative strategy, an emotion-focused goal, "breath out before each putt". In the 
holistic process goal group, two participants employed alternative strategies. Two 
external cues were used early in the pre-performance routine: "read the green" and 
"use markers to line ball up". Despite these minor remaining difficulties, 100% of 
participants in both groups thought that they had carried out the instructions as 
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requested. Chi square tests indicated that none of the responses differed as a function 
of goal setting group membership. 
State anxiety 
Table 1 (below) shows the mean scores for cognitive and somatic anxiety and self- 
confidence in the baseline and competition conditions. ANOVA revealed that the 
main effect for anxiety condition was significant for cognitive anxiety, F (1,18) = 
10.32, p< . 05, cot = . 15. The main effects for anxiety condition for somatic anxiety, 
F (1,18) = . 11, p> . 05, w= . 04, and self-confidence, F (1,18) = . 16, p> . 05, w2 = 
. 00, 
both failed to reach significance. Examination of the cell means in Table 1 
(below) shows that cognitive anxiety increased during the competition phase of the 
session. No significant Group x Anxiety Condition interactions or main effects for 
group were found for: cognitive anxiety, F (1,18) = 3.03, p> . 05, w2 = . 06, and F 
(1,18) _ . 44, p> . 
05, cot = . 0001, respectively; somatic anxiety, F (1,18) = 1.92, p> 
. 05, c02 = . 
04, and F (1,18) _ . 15, p> . 05, w2 = . 00, respectively; or self-confidence, 
F (1,18) = 1.16, p>. 05,0 =. 007, andF(1,18)=. 004, p>. 05,0=. 00, 
respectively. 
Table 1. Mean (SD) cognitive and somatic anxiety scores. 
Part process goal Holistic process goal 
CSAI-2 Low High Low High 
Subcomponent anxiety anxiety anxiety anxiety 
Cognitive anxiety 15.90 (2.81) 19.60 (5.32) 15.80 (5.45) 16.90 (5.80) 
Somatic anxiety 14.90 (4.77) 16.90 (5.86) 14.90 (6.03) 15.10 (4.58) 
Self-confidence 26.10 (6.05) 24.80 (4.83) 25.30 (5.54) 25.90 (5.92) 
Performance 
In terms of the number of successful putts, the performance of the part and holistic 
process goal groups remained relatively stable across anxiety conditions (Table 2, 
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below). ANOVA revealed no significant Anxiety x Goal Group interaction, F (1, 
18) = . 02, p> . 
05,0 2= . 00; or main effects for anxiety condition, F (1,18) = . 02, p 
> . 05, w2 = . 00; or goal group, F (1,18) = . 16, p> . 05, c02 = . 00. ANOVA also 
confirmed that absolute error for both process goal groups remained stable. Neither 
the Anxiety x Goal Group interaction, F (1,18) = . 003, p> . 05, w2 = . 00; nor main 
effects for anxiety condition or goal group were significant, F (1,18) _ . 11, p> . 05, 
cue = . 0001, and F (1,18) = 1.65, p> . 05,0 = . 03, respectively. 
Table 2. Mean (SD) performance scores. 
Part process goal Holistic process goal 
Performance Low High Low High 
variables anxiety anxiety anxiety anxiety 
Performance success 6.20 (2.10) 5.90 (1.73) 6.50 (2.07) 6.30 (2.63) 
Absolute error (cm) 13.00 (11.00) 12.00 (6.00) 9.00 (6.00) 12.00 (12.00) 
Self-reported effort 
The patterning of the self-reported effort scores revealed that performers increased 
their effort expenditure as a function of anxiety across both goal setting groups, part 
process goal low anxiety mean = 8.00 (SD = 1.63), high anxiety mean = 8.70 (SD = 
1.25); holistic process goal low anxiety mean = 7.50 (SD = 1.17), high anxiety mean 
= 9.10 (SD = . 88). 
ANOVA confirmed that the main effect for anxiety condition was 
significant, F (1,18) = 25.74, p< . 0001, w2 = . 31. Neither the Anxiety x Goal group 
interaction, F (1,18) = 3.94, p> . 05, «2 = . 07; nor the main effect for group, F (1, 
18) = .01, p> . 
05, cn2 = . 00, were significant. 
Discussion 
The main aim of the study was to examine the effect of part and holistic process goal 
strategies on golf putting performance under stress. It was hypothesised that under 
conditions of high anxiety, part process goals would induce lapses into conscious 
processing, resulting in performance impairment, while holistic process goals would 
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encourage automatic processing, and help to maintain performance. An attempt was 
also made to examine the patterning of self-reported effort across goal setting and 
anxiety conditions. It was hypothesised that the use of part process goals would 
result in higher levels of effort under stress as they induced conscious processing. 
The anxiety intervention proved successful, significantly increasing cognitive 
anxiety. Despite this success, ecological validity remains a problem in laboratory- 
based anxiety research. As other researchers have found, the actual levels of 
cognitive anxiety reported in the laboratory fall short of those reported in actual 
competition (Chapter 5 of this thesis; Williams & Elliott, 1999). It appears that 
despite the ingenuity shown by researchers in developing anxiety interventions, it is 
unlikely that any lab-based intervention can approximate the recipe of emotions 
experienced by athletes in actual competition. Jackson and Wilson's competition 
intervention has, however, proved to be successful in elevating cognitive anxiety, 
and offers researchers a viable alternative to more common anxiety interventions, 
such as evaluative instructions (Calvo, 1985; Janelle, Singer, & Williams, 1999; 
Mullen & Hardy, in press) and time-to-event paradigms (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991). 
Bearing in mind the increase in cognitive anxiety, the absence of performance 
decrements was a little surprising. However, performance in high anxiety control 
conditions has remained consistently stable, or even improved in previous studies 
(Mullen & Hardy, in press; Chapter 5 of this thesis), indicating that performance 
effectiveness can be quite robust in the face of stress. Both performance dependent 
variables remained stable as a function of anxiety and goal setting conditions. The 
part process goals failed to produce the hypothesised conscious processing effects. 
The stability of performance can at least be explained by the patterning of self- 
reported effort. Participants in both goal-setting groups increased their effort 
expenditure in the high anxiety condition. Mullen & Hardy (in press) also found that 
anxious participants expended more effort. The allocation of additional effort by 
anxious performers is a central prediction of Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing 
efficiency theory, which states that high levels of state anxiety produce a dynamic 
response from performers in order to maintain task performance at acceptable levels. 
In order to accomplish this goal, performers allocate extra resources to the task. This 
increase in effort, while maintaining performance effectiveness results in less 
efficient processing. In the present study, the increased effort may have helped 
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prevent performance impairment, supporting a processing efficiency interpretation 
of the data. 
The stability of self-confidence in the present study matched results found in 
previous studies. Mullen & Hardy (in press) suggested that self-confidence might 
play a key role in enabling anxious performers to allocate extra effort to tasks. The 
findings regarding the role of self-confidence have to date been mixed. While 
Mullen and Hardy found that confidence remained stable and effort increased across 
anxiety conditions, performance effectiveness was only maintained for the poorer 
putters in the study. The data presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis indicated that 
individuals might be able to maintain self-confidence levels despite increases in 
cognitive anxiety. Self-reported effort, however, remained stable in a high anxiety 
condition and it appeared that the anxious performers were unable to allocate extra 
resources to the putting task and performance deteriorated. The role that self- 
confidence plays in allowing performers to allocate extra resources to the task 
requires further clarification. Carver and Scheier (1998) highlight the importance of 
self-confidence in helping individuals to persist at tasks under difficult conditions. 
Carver and Scheier suggest that a form of "confidence threshold" might exist, below 
which "persistence gives way to giving up" (p. 6). Researchers investigating the 
anxiety-performance relationship may need to consider wider theoretical constructs 
to adequately explain performance impairment under stress. 
The social validation questionnaire played an important role in identifying 
problematic participants. Ten participants were removed from each process goal 
group and statistical power was seriously compromised. It appears that the goal- 
setting intervention was not totally effective. One possible explanation for this 
problem is that the goal setting intervention was unable to modify the performance 
routines of the participants. Even though the participants were of intermediate skill 
levels, they may have possessed well-developed, automatic performance routines. 
Future research should include a training period, during which participants are 
taught how to use part and holistic process goals effectively. The issue of goal- 
setting effectiveness might also be addressed by extending the number of putting 
trials. More practice may enable individuals to use the goal-setting strategies more 
effectively. 
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Summary and conclusions 
In terms of practical implications, the results offer little support for the efficacy of 
holistic process goals over part process goals for anxious performers. The results do, 
however, indicate that performers can benefit from expending additional effort when 
they are anxious. The processes by which this extra effort can be applied remain 
unclear. In conclusion, the present study offers little evidence for conscious 
processing effects using part process goals and the conscious processing - process 
goal paradox remains unresolved. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Concluding Comments 
Introduction 
The purpose of this final chapter is to draw together the findings of the thesis. The 
chapter is divided into five sections, as follows: the first section provides a resume 
of the aims and major findings of the research, the second section examines the 
major conceptual and theoretical issues emanating from the five studies, the third 
section addresses the applied implications generated by the research programme, the 
fourth section highlights the strengths and limitations of the programme, and the 
final section provides recommendations for future research. 
Summary 
This research project set out to examine the conscious processing hypothesis as a 
possible explanation for anxiety effects upon the performance of motor skills. As 
indicated in the introduction, anxiety research has concentrated largely on predicting 
when anxiety produces a negative effect upon performance. In terms of identifying 
the mechanisms through which anxiety exerts its negative influence, much previous 
sport psychology research has relied largely upon the simplistic attentional theories 
of Easterbrook (1959) and Wine (1971,1980). Masters (1992b) formulated the 
conscious processing hypothesis based on evidence derived from previous research 
(Bliss, 1893; Boder, 1935; Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister & Showers, 1986) 
suggesting that pressure might cause performers to turn the focus of their attention 
inwards. These studies, however, had failed to make an explicit link between 
declarative knowledge about task performance and the consequences of using such 
knowledge when cognitive anxiety was high. 
At the commencement of this programme of research, Masters (1992b) had 
produced the only real evidence for conscious processing effects. However, 
conscious processing was not the only viable interpretation of Masters' data. Study 1 
was specifically designed to address a task difficulty interpretation of Masters' data 
from within a multidimensional state anxiety framework. To achieve this, study 1 
replicated and extended Masters' original experiment. Participants in Masters' study 
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acquired the skill of golf putting under explicit and implicit learning conditions. The 
novices in the explicit learning group were given instructions on how to putt 
correctly and were asked to use this information during their practice sessions. The 
novices in the implicit learning group performed a random letter generation task that 
prevented them generating or accessing explicit knowledge about putting. After 400 
practice trials, both groups, along with several others, putted under high anxiety 
conditions. Under stress, the implicit learning group continued to improve, whereas 
the explicit learning group did not. However, the implicit learning group was not 
asked to continue the random letter generation task during the high anxiety 
condition. As a result, their continued improvement could be attributed to a 
reduction in task difficulty. Study 1 controlled for this possible confound by adding 
an extra implicit learning group that continued to perform the random letter 
generation task in the high anxiety condition. It was hypothesised that the new 
implicit learning group would suffer performance impairment under stress. The 
results failed to support this hypothesis, adding support to Masters' conscious 
processing hypothesis. However, study 1 was not without its own limitations. 
Another possible confound was identified. In performing the random letter 
generation task over 400 learning trials, participants may have become desensitised 
to self-generated verbalisations and at least partially immune to the effects of 
competitive state anxiety. 
Study 2 was designed to provide a test of the conscious processing hypothesis 
that was not confounded by desensitisation effects. A performance, rather than 
learning, paradigm was adopted. Experienced trampolinists were asked to perform 
using explicit knowledge under low and high anxiety conditions. Explicit knowledge 
was provided for the performers by means of a shadowing technique, as suggested 
by Masters (1992a). The performers' coach called out a coaching point for each 
specific move in the voluntary competition routine and participants were asked to 
concentrate on using the explicit "cues" to guide their performance. The 
combination of explicit knowledge and high state anxiety resulted in the 
trampolinists registering a decrement in performance, thereby supporting the 
predictions of the conscious processing hypothesis. However, the performance 
deficits could also be attributed to an attentional threshold explanation. Attentional 
effects may have been caused by the relevant cues taking up a portion of attentional 
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capacity and anxiety taking up a further portion, thereby depleting attentional 
capacity sufficiently to impair performance. 
The purpose of study 3 was to control for both the desensitisation and attentional 
threshold hypotheses. The performance paradigm used in study 2 was retained and 
an additional task was included in the experimental design. Retaining the 
performance paradigm avoided the problem of desensitisation associated with the 
learning paradigm used in study 1. Skilled golfers were asked to putt while 
simultaneously performing the random letter generation task used in study 1. The 
addition of the random letter generation task also afforded an examination of the 
attentional threshold explanation identified in study 2. From a conscious processing 
perspective, the random letter generation task should have prevented performers 
accessing their explicit knowledge base, while the shadowing task encouraged lapses 
into conscious processing. However, according to the attentional hypothesis, both 
the task-relevant shadowing task and the task-irrelevant random letter generation 
task should have served as distractions, consuming attentional resources, and in 
combination with high levels of cognitive anxiety, impairing performance. Study 3 
also extended the research project in two additional ways: (a) a self-report scale was 
included to examine the patterning of effort invested by performers, and (b) an 
interdisciplinary approach was adopted, incorporating an exploratory, in vivo two- 
dimensional kinematic analysis of the experimental task, golf putting. Performance 
differences were identified in the skill level of the sample, resulting in a 
dichotomisation based on putting ability in the low anxiety control condition. For 
"better" putters, the results partially supported the conscious processing hypothesis, 
as performance deteriorated when the better golfers putted using explicit knowledge 
in the high anxiety condition. The patterning of self-reported effort supported the 
processing efficiency prediction that anxious performers increase the amount of 
effort invested in a task. The kinematic analysis revealed little in the way of effects 
that could be interpreted as offering firm support for conscious processing. 
Study 4 was a refinement of the design used in study 3. Additionally, the 
interdisciplinary focus was extended to include a three-dimensional, in vivo 
kinematic analysis using a more complex model of joint dynamics, and spectral 
analysis of heart rate variability as a cardiovascular index of effort. The results lent 
themselves to a processing efficiency interpretation. However, conscious processing 
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effects could not be totally discounted. While self-reported effort remained stable as 
a function of both anxiety and putting conditions, heart rate variability scores 
partially mirrored those found for performance. The patterning of heart rate 
variability indicated that the combination of high anxiety and relevant and irrelevant 
tasks may have produced a sub-optimal respiratory activation pattern. The kinematic 
data supported the ecological notion that anxious performers might attempt to regain 
task control by "re-freezing" degrees of freedom in the distal (wrist) joint. 
The focus of study 5 was more applied in nature, although still laboratory based. 
Throughout this research programme, concern has been expressed about the use of 
process goals by highly skilled but anxious performers. The conscious processing 
hypothesis suggests that the use of process goals by skilled, but anxious performers 
might actively encourage lapses into conscious processing. However, holistic 
process goals that encapsulate a movement in its entirety might maintain a "global" 
task focus and automatic task control, helping to prevent lapses into conscious 
processing. Study 5 examined the use of "part" and "holistic" process goals by 
experienced golfers under high and low anxiety conditions. The use of a goal setting 
manipulation also avoided the potential problems associated with attentional 
overload experienced in earlier studies. The performance of both the part and 
holistic process goal groups remained stable across anxiety conditions. However, it 
appears that participants may require initial training in the use of goal-setting 
strategies before the efficacy of part and holistic goals under stress can be examined. 
Self-reported effort increased in both groups as a function of anxiety, supporting a 
processing efficiency interpretation of the data. 
Theoretical Issues 
A number of theoretical issues have been addressed in this project, which are 
fundamental to explaining anxiety effects upon motor performance. These issues are 
discussed as follows: the conscious processing hypothesis as a viable explanation for 
anxiety effects upon motor performance; personality variables; ecological 
interpretations of the anxiety-performance relationship; the measurement of anxiety; 
interdisciplinarity; and finally, ecological validity. 
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The conscious processing hypothesis as a viable explanation for anxiety effects upon 
motor performance 
The first three studies of the current research programme all produced data that 
supported the conscious processing hypothesis. However, the conscious processing 
hypothesis was unable to account for all the performance effects found throughout 
the programme. For example, the performance effects in study 4 suggested that 
performers might be susceptible to both distraction and conscious processing. 
Processing efficiency theory was included in study 3 as a potential alternative to the 
conscious processing hypothesis. The performance effects from the present 
programme may be best explained using a combination of the conscious processing 
hypothesis and processing efficiency theory. Of particular note is the role of 
compensatory effort. Such effort might have the potential to exert a positive 
moderating effect upon the anxiety-performance relationship, contingent upon 
whether performers perceive themselves to have at least a moderate chance of 
succeeding (Eysenck, 1982). Eysenck (1992) noted that quantitative changes in the 
allocation of processing resources might also be accompanied by qualitative changes 
in processing strategies. Anxious performers may increase effort invested in a task to 
such an extent that they lapse into conscious processing. Thus, when cognitive 
anxiety is elevated, an increase in effort may be beneficial up to a point. However, 
beyond this threshold further increases in effort may lead to lapses into conscious 
processing causing performance impairment. 
The conceptualisation of effort implicit in the emerging model of human 
performance under stress is consistent with "wet" models of cognitive functioning 
(Hockey, Coles, & Gaillard, 1986). Wet models differ from "dry", linear processing 
models in that they account for the "intensive" aspects of behaviour, that is, its 
energy or degree of vigour. According to Hockey et al., an energetical framework 
allows researchers to account for (a) the variability associated with changes in state, 
for example, behaviour changes under stress, (b) relationships between information 
processing operations and the underlying pattern of biological activity, and, (c) 
individual differences in all these areas. Hockey (1986) claimed that adaptive 
regulation to changes in state is essential to preserve performance. According to 
Hockey, the central energetical construct in the active control of resources is effort. 
Mulder (1986) differentiated between two types of effort, the intensity of processing 
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associated with shifts from automatic to controlled processing, as predicted by the 
conscious processing hypothesis, and effort as compensatory control (cf. Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992). This distinction is implicit in the way that effort has been 
conceptualised in the present programme. Mulder claimed that the two types of 
effort have different physiological concomitants, and outlined the ways in which 
these concomitants could be measured. The use of spectral analysis of heart rate 
variability in the present project has helped begin the energetical mapping of the 
effort response of anxious performers. If Mulder was correct and the two types of 
effort are indeed distinct from one another then it appears that separate measures 
may be necessary to map the compensatory and intensive aspects of the effort 
response under stress. However, as Mulder also intimates, there may only be one 
energetical effort resource. It is possible that some threshold exists beyond which 
information processing strategies change, as in the shift from automatic to controlled 
processing, as a function of energetical resource allocation in the form of increased 
effort. 
Alongside effort, self-confidence may also play an important moderating role in 
the context of the anxiety-performance relationship. According to Eysenck (1982), 
anxious performers will invest effort in a task only if they perceive themselves to 
have at least a moderate chance of succeeding. At the outset of the present research 
programme, self-confidence did not play a major part in the predictions of the 
conscious processing hypothesis. However, as the programme progressed and the 
findings were interpreted using combinations of processing efficiency theory and the 
conscious processing hypothesis, it became apparent that self-confidence might have 
a crucial role to play in accounting for the data. Carver and Scheier (1998) note that 
"the interruption of action in the face of adversity is tied to a deliberative assessment 
of the likelihood of success, given continued efforts" (p. 176). Earlier, Carver and 
Scheier (1988) had indicated that as long as favourable expectancies regarding goal 
attainment were maintained, then anxiety would increase performance. Self- 
confident performers presumably retain favourable goal attainment expectancies. As 
such, self-confidence has also been specifically proposed as a mechanism that might 
"protect" performers against the negative effects of anxiety upon performance 
(Hardy, 1996a). As Bandura (1997) stated, "the stronger the sense of efficacy, the 
bolder people are in taking on the problematic situations that breed stress and the 
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greater their success in shaping them more to their liking" (p. 141). One might 
speculate about the manner in which self-confidence might operate. It may be that 
some self-confidence threshold exists, above which cognitively anxious performers 
might retain favourable task expectancies and return efforts towards a task. 
Further support for an amalgamation of the conscious processing hypothesis and 
processing efficiency theory can be found in proposals suggested by Hardy (1997). 
Hardy, seeking to explain potential mechanisms underlying performance 
catastrophes, suggested that the conscious processing hypothesis and processing 
efficiency theory might have the potential to do so. Hardy tentatively proposed that 
if anxious but confident performers invest effort in a task then performance might be 
improved. However, if performers increase their effort to such a degree that they 
lapse into conscious processing, then performance might suffer dramatically. 
Performance catastrophes (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994) 
could thus be explained by a withdrawal of effort, an effort-induced lapse into 
conscious processing, or both. Cognitively anxious performers may thus find the 
investment of effort beneficial up to a point, beyond which further increases may 
lead to catastrophic performance decrements due to lapses into conscious 
processing. 
Catastrophe models may be the most promising means of modelling the 
differential effects found within the present research programme. Cusp catastrophe 
models examine the three-dimensional, interactive relationship between cognitive 
anxiety, physiological arousal and performance. Hardy (1996a) has extended the 
basic cusp catastrophe model to include personal control and self-confidence as 
additional variables, resulting in a five-dimensional butterfly model. One can 
speculate that effort may also need inclusion in catastrophe models in order to reflect 
the complex interactions that may occur. Effort may need to replace one of the 
control parameters in Hardy's (1996a) butterfly catastrophe. Hardy (1996a) used 
Guastello's (1982; 1987) method of dynamic differences to test a butterfly model of 
anxiety and performance. The results partially supported the model. Although 
catastrophe models and the analysis techniques used to test them are complex, they 
may be the best way forward in terms of modelling the relationship between anxiety 
and performance (Hardy, 1996b). Future research adopting this approach will need 
to adopt an alternative to Guastello's method of dynamic differences, which might 
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currently be considered disreputable. Hardy (1996) identified two alternative 
surface-fitting procedures that might be considered by researchers in this respect 
(Oliva, Descarbo, Day, and Jedidi, 1987; Cobb, 1981). 
Personality variables 
Dispositional factors may also be important in helping to explain the precise way in 
which anxiety affects motor performance using the conscious processing hypothesis. 
Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) information processing model of arousal and 
performance included several personality variables, and similar dimensions might 
be relevant in the context of conscious processing effects. Masters, Polman, and 
Hammond (1993) suggested that some individuals may be more predisposed than 
others to lapse into conscious processing. Masters et al. devised the Reinvestment 
Scale to measure the tendency to focus on the mechanics of movements. Despite the 
criticisms levelled at the Reinvestment Scale in Chapter 1, it is possible that a 
complete understanding of conscious processing effects may need to examine the 
influence of dispositional individual differences. 
Self-focus (Baumeister, 1984) may also be important. The potential influence of 
private and public aspects of self-consciousness on performance was considered in 
Chapter 4. There was a suggestion that the presence of the video camera may have 
increased self-focus and conscious processing in the experimental conditions. As 
noted earlier, however, the use of the video camera may not have unduly influenced 
self-focus due to the differential effects of self-focus manipulations on public and 
private aspects of self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1998). It was argued that, 
as a video camera would appear to affect the social side the self, which is unrelated 
to an awareness of internal states, there would have been negligible effects upon 
conscious processing. However, a predisposition to focus on the private aspect of the 
self might provide researchers with a dimension of personality worthy of further 
investigation in the context of conscious processing. 
Ecological interpretations the anxiety-performance relationship 
The current research programme was placed largely within a cognitive theoretical 
framework. However, some of the hypotheses generated for the kinematic analysis 
in studies 3 and 4 were "borrowed" from the ecological paradigm. Various 
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researchers have suggested that cognitions and emotions should be considered as 
dynamical processes (Davids, Bennett, Court, Tayler, & Button, 1997; Kelso, 1995; 
Thelen, 1995). In this context, anxiety would be regarded as an organismic 
constraint that interacts with environmental and task constraints to shape behaviour. 
Thus, anxiety would be viewed as a control parameter, constraining the collective 
variables underpinning task performance. Within the motor control literature, there 
have been calls for the integration of cognitive and ecological models (Abernethy & 
Sparrow, 1992). Williams, Davids and Williams (1999) have noted that current 
attempts to integrate cognition and action take two approaches. The first of these are 
attempts by movement scientists to integrate intentionality within an ecological 
framework and cognitive scientists to incorporate dynamical models into neural 
network models of cognition (van Gelder, 1998; Kelso, 1995; Thelen, 1995). The 
second involves a "shifting focus" (Bongaardt, 1996). As Williams et al. point out, 
the concept of shifting focus refers to an approach that requires more than one model 
to explain movement behaviour. "Quite simply, the argument is that in order to 
study movement behaviour one needs a shifting focus between the three key 
processes (coordination, exploration, and planning), suggesting that more than one 
type of model is necessary to describe behaviour at all levels of the movement 
system" (p. 376). 
Heterarchical models of movement behaviour (Rumelhart & Norman, 1982) may 
be one way in which the conscious processing hypothesis might contribute to an 
integrated cognitive-dynamic explanation of the processes underpinning the anxiety- 
performance relationship (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). Such systems comprise 
higher-order strategic control mechanisms and lower-order operators. As noted in 
the introduction of this thesis, the higher-order mechanisms might direct the lower 
level mechanisms without conscious awareness of the operations performed at lower 
levels. Thus, the lower level operators may be composed of self-organising 
structures functioning according to the principles of dynamical systems. The 
operation of the lower level operators might become subverted by conscious 
attempts to regain task control by the higher level operators of cognitively anxious 
performers. 
Ecological theories are non-linear and, once again, intuitive links to catastrophe 
models of anxiety and performance also appear to have the potential to provide a 
134 
framework for a dynamical account of the anxiety-performance relationship. For 
example, it may be that a more fine-grained analysis of the processes underpinning 
performance could lead to an extension of the single behaviour dimensions included 
in cusp and butterfly models of anxiety and performance. Higher-order catastrophes 
using two, or more, behaviour dimensions (Zeeman, 1976) may be way of modelling 
the effects of combinations of control parameters such as cognitive anxiety, 
physiological arousal, self-confidence and effort upon behaviour dimensions that 
include key kinematic processes such as the restrictions in joint ranges of motion 
presented in Chapter 5. 
The measurement of anxiety 
The present research project relied upon the manipulation of state anxiety as the 
basis for the experimental designs adopted. As such, the measurement of 
performers' anxiety responses is an important issue. With the exception of study 2, 
which utilised the children's version of Spielberger's (1970) State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, the present research programme relied upon the Competitive State 
Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990a) to 
measure participants' response to the anxiety interventions. Several researchers have 
recently called into question the validity of the CSAI-2 and all other available 
anxiety measures. For example, research addressing performers' directional 
interpretations of their affective state using a modified version of the CSAI-2 has 
provided empirical evidence that performers can interpret statements in the CSAI-2 
quite differently (Jones & Hanton, 1996; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993). Further 
anecdotal evidence that performers can also interpret items on the CSAI-2 quite 
differently was presented by Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, and Plake (1986), who felt 
sufficiently strongly about this point that they removed the first item from the CSAI- 
2. The item confused their participants, who were unsure whether "I am concerned 
about this competition" was asking whether they were worried about the impending 
competition or just that the competition was important. Furthermore, the items 
included in the CSAI-2 may not have represented the most important aspects of 
competitive anxiety for the trampolinists who participated in Study 2 and the golfers 
who participated in studies 3,4, and 5. For example, "My hands are clammy" would 
be more likely to concern a golfer about to putt than a trampolinist waiting to 
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perform their routine. Task specific versions of the CSAI-2 may be more 
appropriate. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the construct validity of the 
CSAI-2 can be called into question. Lane, Sewell, Terry, Bartram and Nesti (1999) 
have also questioned the structural validity of the CSAI-2, concluding that further 
validation of the CSAI-2 is required. The limitations identified above have obvious 
implications for the findings of the present research project. In mitigation, however, 
the CSAI-2 currently remains the "gold standard" in terms of the measurement of 
competitive state anxiety in the absence of any better or more appropriate 
instrument. 
Interdisciplinary research 
Sports scientists have also been encouraged to take a more "rounded" or holistic 
approach to the study of human movement (Dishman, 1994; Maguire, 1990; 
Morgan, 1989). The majority of calls for such integration have promoted an 
interdisciplinary, rather than mono or multidisciplinary, perspective to be taken by 
researchers in sports science (Burwitz, Moore, & Wilkinson, 1994). Interdisciplinary 
research has the advantage of bringing expertise from different subdisciplines to 
bear collectively upon research problems. A truly interdisciplinary approach has the 
advantage of enabling the interactions between different aspects of human behaviour 
to be studied. Multidisciplinary research, on the other hand, produces a more 
fragmented picture of human behaviour in that typically only an additive 
characterisation of behaviour can be composed. The methods adopted in studies 3 
and 4 represent a genuine interdisciplinary focus, including kinematic and 
innovative physiological approaches to the study of the anxiety-performance 
relationship. Such interdisciplinary approaches may offer researchers a much more 
global insight into the processes and mechanisms underlying anxiety effects. 
The use of spectral analysis of heart rate variability enabled an examination of 
the dynamics of the cardiovascular system in anxious performers. The specific 
hypothesis proposed for the response of the mid-frequency band was not supported. 
However, examination of the high-frequency band revealed a possible change to 
performers' activation states associated with respiratory activity under high anxiety, 
dual-task conditions. As mentioned above, spectral analysis of heart rate variability 
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has the potential to provide a window on the energetics underlying human 
functioning under stress. 
The kinematic analysis of movement behaviour produced evidence of changes in 
joint control strategies associated with high anxiety. Kinematics would appear to be 
an important feature of an interdisciplinary focus on the conscious processing 
hypothesis. Masters (1992a) originally suggested that the loss of fluency of 
movements under the control of conscious processing might be indexed using 
kinematic analysis. Studies 3 and 4 approached this problem using different 
strategies. Study 3 relied upon the suggestion that higher-order derivatives might be 
more susceptible to conscious processing effects (Fuchs, 1962; Lee & Swinnen, 
1993). No evidence was found to support these ideas. Study 4 used ideas generated 
by Beuter, Duda, and Widule (1989) and Beuter and Duda (1985) to examine the 
fluency of joint dynamics. The phase plane portraits used in study 4 indicated that a 
reduction in the range of motion of the left wrist joint resulted in a "compressed" 
angular velocity-displacement pattern. The compression produced several crossings 
in the phase plane portraits, which may be indicative of a loss of fluency (Beuter & 
Duda, 1985). 
Masters (1992a) originally suggested that losses of fluency might be indexed by 
changes in jerk. Masters' proposal was founded in the notion that the central nervous 
system might optimise movement smoothness by minimising mean-square jerk 
(Hogan & Flash, 1987). Jerk is the third time derivative of time-position 
information, or the rate of change of acceleration. Hogan and Flash were attempting 
to construct a quantitative measure of smoothness or gracefulness. However, Young 
and Marteniuk (1997) demonstrated that jerk is not minimised for end-effector or 
joint kinematics during the acquisition of a multi joint kicking task. The fact that 
smoothness may not be a feature of movement optimisation casts doubt upon Hogan 
and Flash's minimum jerk model of motor planning. As little evidence exists for the 
optimisation of mean-squared jerk during the acquisition of a multi joint movement, 
it seems logical to suggest that the same parameter should not be responsible for 
losses of fluency experienced by anxious performers consciously processing 
information. However, this issue requires empirical clarification. 
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Ecological validity 
The importance of ecological validity in the context of the present research 
programme warrants some attention. Sport psychology has adopted a more applied 
focus in recent years with limited attention being paid to measuring precise 
parameters in controlled environments. Martens (1979) led the move towards the 
adoption of more ecologically valid field settings and away from laboratories. In 
terms of research focus, the present project has concentrated upon establishing 
causal relations in controlled laboratory settings. As such, this move towards more 
"traditional" experimental methods can be criticised by researchers searching for 
research high in external validity. Thus, in terms of ecological validity, several 
aspects of the research programme are open to criticism. Before discussing these it is 
probably worth providing the reader with a framework within which the specific 
criticisms can be placed. Davids (1988) defined ecological validity as "a transient 
phenomenon characterised by informed and systematic attempts to analyse actual 
behaviour within specific environmental contexts, utilising unobtrusive, realistic, 
and reliable methods of investigation" (p. 127). Davids provided researchers with 
several criteria to judge the ecological validity of their research. These criteria 
included realism, which consists of behaviour constancy and variable specificity. 
Behaviour constancy refers to the extent that researchers adopt the actual movement 
pattern used in sports tasks. In the present project, steps were taken to ensure that 
experimental tasks were relevant to participants in order to ensure behaviour 
constancy, but also to enhance participants' motivation during the studies. Variable 
specificity refers to the replication in the research environment of variables found in 
real-life situations. One of the major limitations of the research conducted as part of 
this programme involved the contrived anxiety interventions. Throughout the project 
the various anxiety interventions successfully increased cognitive anxiety, which 
was central to the conscious processing hypothesis. However, despite the significant 
increases reported in cognitive anxiety, the actual levels reported by participants 
were below those found in actual competition. The criticism of variable specificity 
could also be directed at the shadowing, random letter generation, and tone counting 
tasks used to encourage and prevent lapses into conscious processing. The 
manipulation checks administered throughout the project indicated that there were 
indeed some problems experienced by performers in implementing these tasks. 
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However, exact variable specificity is not always possible, or desirable. In the 
context of the present research aims to uncover strictly controlled relations among 
variables, it would be impossible, not to mention unethical, to sufficiently isolate 
such variables in field settings to allow precise interventions and measurement. In 
mitigation, in study 5 the research programme did progress to the use of more 
realistic interventions using self-talk, imagery and process goals to attempt to induce 
conscious processing. 
Davids' second criterion was termed union and, in the present context, involves 
the union of laboratory control and a naturalistic setting producing minimal 
interference with real-life activity. One method of achieving union in a research 
programme is to progress from conducting laboratory-based experimental designs to 
field-based studies. Although study 2 was field-based, the design was not without 
limitations. It was not possible to achieve further progression within the confines of 
the present project. The adoption of an interdisciplinary focus was partly responsible 
for the retention of laboratory settings. It should be pointed out that the persistence 
with, and refinement of, the techniques used in the present research programme has 
produced internally valid evidence that can underpin future research that may have a 
more applied focus. It must be noted, however, that the immediate concerns for 
future research into the conscious processing hypothesis will almost certainly require 
further work in controlled laboratory settings. Study 2 aside, the persistence with the 
golf putting task did mean that the experimental task was consistently realistic and 
this afforded objective, unobtrusive, in vivo measurement of the kinematics of the 
movement. Davids' final criterion involves the use of eclectic analysis, which refers 
to the adoption of a range of research methods ranging from tightly-controlled 
laboratory experiments to idiographic, qualitative designs. While the 
interdisciplinary focus of the present research project has meant that a range of 
measurement methods have been adopted, the range of research methodologies and 
designs has been somewhat limited. Hopefully, this situation can be redressed by 
future research, which could adopt idiographic and qualitative methodologies to 
address some of the issues concerning the conscious processing hypothesis. 
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Applied Implications 
The experimental focus of the research programme has highlighted several practical 
issues of interest to performers, coaches and sport psychologists. 
Explicit learning strategies 
Study 1 differed from the remaining studies in that the research design was based 
upon a learning paradigm. The performance impairment experienced by the explicit 
learning group highlighted the fragility of skills acquired using traditional explicit 
approaches to motor learning. The robustness of the performance of the implicit 
learning group under stress indicated that coaching strategies adopting a more 
implicit orientation might result in performance that is more resistant to the effects 
of competitive state anxiety. While the secondary task used in study I proved 
successful in encouraging implicit learning, it would prove difficult to use with 
sports performers. Random letter generation would be arduous and tiring to use in 
practice, almost certainly undermining the intrinsic motivation necessary to persist at 
practice. Alternatives such as modelling and imagery might be of use to coaches and 
performers in developing more holistic conceptual representations of movements, 
thereby encouraging less reliance upon verbally mediated processes. 
Demonstrations, traditionally a popular coaching strategy, would appear to play an 
important role in such processes. Coaches can also use metaphor and imagery to 
convey information about complex movements (Masters, 1992a). For example, a 
soccer goalkeeper coach might typically employ visual analogies to describe the 
basic "set" position of the goalkeeper. A common analogy used is that of a 
gunfighter ready to "draw" with both hands. This simple analogy conveys the 
information contained in the following description by Wilson (1980, p. 37): 
... the 
`keeper's basic position should be with feet slightly apart and 
knees slightly bent. The main part of his weight should be on the soles 
of the feet with the immediate spring coming from the toes. The body is 
inclined forward slightly ... and so too are the arms ... 
If you incline 
your arms, and consequently your hands, very low you should 
appreciate that shoulder or head high shots require a greater movement 
than a midway position. Similarly, a high arm and hand position 
demands awareness of the extra movement involved for a low ground 
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shot. Ideally, therefore, I would advocate a midway position, one 
assuring equal confidence and success with low or high shots. 
Clearly, the use of analogy and metaphor by coaches might allow performers to 
avoid translating the explicit information contained in the above description from 
verbal perceptual processes across the action-language bridge into action perceptual 
processes before action is initiated (cf. Annett, 1991). It would be possible to test 
this suggestion by designing a study in which participants acquire a motor skill 
explicitly and using analogy. The use of analogy might avoid the problem of lower 
levels of performance experienced by the implicit learners in studies that used 
random letter generation to encourage implicit learning (Masters, 1992b; Hardy, 
Mullen et al., 1996). The robustness of analogy learning to stress could then be 
tested using a stress transfer trial, such as that used in studyl. 
The earlier discussion of ecological models of motor control and learning might 
also be relevant in the context of implicit learning. In dynamical systems terms, 
implicit learning would be considered as discovery learning. An ecological 
interpretation of Masters' (1992b) and Hardy, Mullen, and Jones' (1996) findings 
would suggest that more stable dynamics were revealed through discovery learning. 
According to Williams et al. (1999), "These dynamics proved to be more resistant to 
the perturbing forces enforced by the organismic constraint of anxiety" (p. 322). As 
such, any future research on analogy learning might consider cognitive and 
dynamical interpretations of implicit learning effects. 
Process goals 
The final four studies of the present project concentrated on examining the 
performance of experienced but anxious participants. The applied sport psychology 
literature currently recommends using process goals as a method of retaining or 
regaining focus during performance (Bull, Albinson, & Shambrook, 1996; Kingston 
& Hardy, 1994a; Kingston & Hardy, 1997). The use of process goals typically 
involves performers focusing upon a specific subcomponent of a task. According to 
the conscious processing hypothesis, the explicit content of process goals should 
have deleterious effects upon performance when competitors are cognitively 
anxious. Within the current research programme, explicit, task-relevant knowledge 
consistently caused performance impairment, with the exception, ironically, of the 
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final study that specifically examined the use of part and holistic process goals upon 
the performance of anxious golfers. For highly-skilled performers, the use of holistic 
process goals has been advocated as a subtle way of avoiding the explicit content of 
part process goals. Holistic process goals might help skilled performers avoid lapses 
into conscious processing by encouraging global representations of entire movement 
sequences, promoting "chunking" and automatic processing. However, strong 
recommendations regarding the use of goal setting strategies by skilled but anxious 
performers should be tempered with caution until more conclusive evidence 
regarding the use of explicit knowledge under stress has been presented. With this 
point in mind, holistic process goals appear to provide practitioners with the safest 
method of implementing process goal strategies for skilled performers. Part process 
goals may still be effective for performers who are less than expert. 
It does appear that increases in effort can compensate for the negative effects of 
anxiety upon performance (cf. Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Recommendations for 
practitioners would seem a little premature until the exact role of effort in the 
anxiety-performance relationship is clarified. For example, it remains to be seen 
whether compensatory effort is the result of qualitative or quantitative changes in 
energetical resource allocation. Specifically, it is unclear whether compensatory 
effort arises as a result of increases in performer's current energetical patterns, or 
whether qualitative changes in energetical resource allocation are necessary before 
compensatory mechanisms can be initiated. 
Dealing with distractions 
Study 4 also produced evidence suggestive of distraction effects under conditions of 
high state anxiety. Several strategies may help performers deal with the effects of 
distraction. Overlearning and simulation training are two such strategies. Simulation 
training involving practice in the face of typical distractors may assist performers in 
dealing with the same distractions under the pressure of competition. Overlearning 
of skills would enable performers to reproduce skills in competition no matter what 
situations or doubts arose. However, as Hardy, Jones and Gould (1996) note, no 
empirical research has directly addressed the question of how much overlearning is 
required to achieve such a state and any recommendations made to practitioners 
would have to be based largely on anecdotal evidence. 
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Research Strengths 
The main strength of the present research programme has been the interdisciplinary 
focus on a specific research question. The methods adopted have laid the 
foundations for future research to build a comprehensive, holistic picture of the 
cognitive and energetical dynamics underlying performers responses to competitive 
anxiety. The use of spectral analysis of heart rate variability (HRV) is particularly 
notable. HRV has been more commonly applied in physiologically-oriented sports 
science. The use of HRV in the current research project represents a unique and 
innovative approach to the study of the energetical processes underlying the 
behaviour of anxious performers. In addition, the research programme has addressed 
a number of limitations and recommendations for future research that have been 
identified by previous researchers. These include the need for: 
1. The removal of conceptual ambiguities (Hardy & Jones, 1990). 
2. Psychophysiological techniques to predict different metacognitive states 
during performance (Hardy & Jones, 1990). 
3. The development of sensitive and precise measures of performance 
(Weinberg, 1990). 
4. Standardised performance environments and tasks (Gould & Krane, 
1992). 
5. The adoption of causal rather than correlational research designs (Gould 
& Krane, 1992). 
6. Process measures of performance (Weinberg & Hunt, 1976). 
7. The incorporation of multi-theory tests (Gould & Krane, 1992). 
8. Consideration of both positive and negative effects of anxiety upon 
performance (Hardy & Jones, 1990). 
9. The inclusion of metacognitive variables other than multidimensional 
anxiety within research designs (Hardy & Jones, 1990). 
10. Future research in sport psychology to be carried out within an 
interdisciplinary context (Morgan, 1989). 
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Research Limitations 
Many of the research limitations of this research programme have been identified in 
the discussions of each individual study, and within the section addressing 
ecological validity. These have been addressed in some detail and will only be listed 
here. The limitations discussed in the context of ecological validity were (a) anxiety 
interventions; (b) secondary tasks used to encourage and prevent lapses into 
conscious processing; and, (c) adoption of a narrow experimental focus that resulted 
in a lack of eclectic analysis. 
Sample sizes were adequate but not optimal. The researcher was faced with the 
problem of including enough participants to ensure that the relatively small effect 
sizes expected using contrived anxiety interventions could be detected while at the 
same time ensuring that the amount of data collected for the kinematic analyses was 
manageable. Traditionally, studies examining biomechanical variables use small 
sample sizes due to the large quantity of data generated. In this respect, the present 
studies used relatively large sample sizes. The time spent by the author processing 
the kinematic data for studies 3 and 4 was substantial. Furthermore, the skills 
required to adequately "clean", filter and enter the data into a manageable database 
form are non-trivial and probably mitigate against a single researcher conducting 
worthwhile examinations of the anxiety-performance relationship using kinematic 
and physiological variables. A "team" approach may prove to be more effective in 
this respect. However, such an approach may lead to a more fractured 
multidisciplinary approach being adopted. In the author's opinion, the ability to 
adopt an inter, rather than multidiscipinary, approach to research questions may 
produce more meaningful results. 
On reflection, the magnitude of the effect sizes that could be expected as a result 
of the hypothesised interaction between anxiety and putting conditions may have 
been predictable for two reasons. Firstly, as noted above, the anxiety effects were 
much reduced in the laboratory environment. Secondly, the size of the changes in 
kinematic parameters would also be small given the fine nature of the putting task 
and the small changes in movement patterns that might be needed to cause 
performance impairment. Future research should either use more realistic anxiety 
interventions, select criterion tasks where increases in anxiety might produce larger 
effects upon kinematic processes, or considerably increase sample sizes. 
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The lack of ecological validity related to the secondary tasks used to induce and 
prevent lapses into conscious processing resulted in problems with adherence. The 
manipulation check administered at the end of studies 3,4, and 5 highlighted these 
problems. In study 4 preliminary analysis of the data negated the need to remove 
"problem" participants, maintaining sample size. However, the problems 
experienced by some of the participants in study 5 resulted in a trimming of the 
sample size by 50%. Clearly, statistical power was compromised in this study. As 
noted in the discussion section of study 5, some form of intensive training using the 
intended goal-setting interventions appears to be essential in future research. The 
limitations of the CSAI-2 as a self-report measure of competitive state anxiety have 
already been alluded to. Given the limitations in the CSAI-2 identified by many 
researchers, hopefully, steps will be taken to rectify this situation in the near future. 
Future Research Directions 
Clearly, the hypothesised conscious processing effects require further clarification. 
The present research programme has provided moderate support for the effects of 
anxiety-induced conscious processing. Future research needs to clarify whether or 
not anxious performers do actually lapse into conscious processing. For example, 
skills will differ in the extent to which conscious processes are necessary for task 
control. Conscious processes may play a more functional role in sports such as rock 
climbing, for example, whereas in sports such as tennis conscious processes should 
be minimally involved in movement production. The extent to which conscious and 
automatic processes interact to produce optimal performance also requires 
clarification. For example, in golf putting it seems logical to suggest that conscious 
processes play a major part in the pre-performance routines of experienced golfers. 
During the actual putting stroke, automatic processes probably predominate. 
Researchers should attempt to clarify whether or not this actually happens. 
Psychophysiological indices might play an important role in answering this question. 
The role of process goals as a means of enhancing or regaining task focus also 
requires further examination. Researchers should ensure that they provide some 
form of structured goal-setting training programme for participants in future studies. 
Study 1 indicated that implicit learning might be more robust in the face of 
disruption by stressors such as anxiety. Analogy learning using modelling and 
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imagery was suggested as a practical method of encouraging implicit learning. 
Future research should examine the potential of analogy learning as means of 
facilitating implicit modes of learning. Such research should also examine the 
suggestion that skills learnt implicitly by analogy might be more resistant to the 
negative effects of anxiety. 
The present research programme has highlighted the role of effort in the anxiety- 
performance relationship. Future research should attempt to clarify the exact 
circumstances under which performers exert more effort and under what 
circumstances this additional effort enhances performance or causes lapses into 
conscious processing. Psychophysiological measures should be used to establish the 
energetical basis of compensatory and conscious processing effort responses. Self- 
confidence has also been highlighted as a mechanism that might moderate the effects 
of anxiety upon performance. Future research efforts should attempt to clarify this 
suggestion. In addition, researchers should combine cognitive anxiety, physiological 
arousal, effort and self-confidence in research designs that examine their interactive 
effects on athletic performance. Other variables may also be important in this 
respect. For example, personal control (Carver & Scheier, 1988), expectancy 
(Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle, 1998), and competence (Schonpflug, 1983). Future 
research should attempt to clarify the exact circumstances and variables that affect 
resource allocation in anxious performers. 
In the context of the heterarchical models that provided a theoretical framework 
for the conceptualised conscious processing effects, researchers should seek to 
clarify the possibility that cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal / somatic 
anxiety exert their effects at different "levels" of such systems. For example, 
conscious processing effects are hypothesised to be mediated by the effects of 
cognitive anxiety upon higher-order mechanisms. Physiological arousal / somatic 
anxiety may function by affecting lower-order automatic mechanisms. The 
hypothesised differential effects upon performance might be indexed by 
manipulating the subcomponents independently and mapping athletes' performance 
effectivenesss and energetical and kinematic responses. 
One of the limitations highlighted earlier was the lack of diversity in terms of 
methodological approaches adopted within the present research programme. A 
recommendation for future research would involve the adoption of a wider range of 
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research methods. For example, qualitative methods may enable researchers to gain 
an insight into athletes' perceptions of the processes and factors that influence their 
performance under stressful conditions. Single-subject experimental designs may 
also be useful in determining idiographic behavioural and energetical profiles of 
anxious performers. 
The measure of anxiety adopted within the present project was the CSAI-2. 
Some of the major limitations of this self-report instrument have been highlighted 
earlier. Researchers should attempt to clarify the validity of the CSAI-2 as a measure 
of anxiety, as researchers have highlighted major deficiencies in its structure. 
Despite the difficulties associated with measurement in the area of stress and 
anxiety, a major challenge faced by researchers is to develop in vivo measures of the 
anxiety response, in order to examine the on-going cyclical influences of anxiety 
upon performance (Hagtvet & Ren-min, 1992). The use of spectral analysis of heart 
rate variability (HRV) as a possible measure of energetical resource allocation 
underlying the behaviour of anxious performers requires further exploration in this 
respect. HRV could possibly be used in conjunction with complementary 
physiological indices of respiration, as suggested in the present project, and blood 
pressure, which is thought to underlie changes in the mid-frequency band of the 
heart rate power spectrum, to establish energetical patterns. However, before this 
happens a major challenge for HRV researchers is to develop indices that move 
beyond the measurement of tonic (long-term) responses toward more sensitive 
indices capable of mapping phasic (short-term) responses to competitive state 
anxiety. 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this research programme was to examine the conscious 
processing hypothesis as a possible explanation for the effect of anxiety upon 
performance. The results have indicated that task-relevant knowledge may have a 
debilitative effect upon anxious performers. Research into the conscious processing 
hypothesis is in its infancy and there is clearly much still to be understood. However, 
this research programme has made a significant contribution to understanding some 
of the conceptual issues surrounding both the conscious processing hypothesis and 
processing efficiency theory. 
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